Three essays in development economics by Jogani, Chitra
c© 2019 Chitra Jogani




Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2019
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Committee:
Associate Professor Rebecca Thornton, Chair
Associate Professor Richard Akresh
Assistant Professor Tatyana Deryugina
Assistant Professor Benjamin Marx
Abstract
This dissertation comprises of three chapters on understanding the effectiveness of public poli-
cies in a democracy. Chapter 1 titled “Effect of Political Quotas on Candidate Attributes and the
Provision of Public Goods” studies the effect of such quotas on attributes of political candidates
and on the provision of public goods. I use a regression discontinuity design that exploits the as-
signment of caste quotas in the latest redistricting in India. I find quotas lead to political candidates
with lower wealth, lower criminal records, but similar education levels. The difference in attributes
is also observed and is more pronounced for the stronger candidates: those affiliated with political
parties, and those elected for office. The caste quotas also increased the representation of women
in politics. I find no significant difference in the level of public goods currently available in rural
India between quota-bound and non-quota-bound areas. The results suggest an increase in political
diversity with no negative effects on the provision of basic facilities.
Chapter 2 titled “Does More Schooling Infrastructure Affect Literacy?” studies how the expan-
sion in schooling infrastructure affects the female literacy rate using the Education for All program
in India. I exploit the variation in the targeting of the program to educationally and not educa-
tionally backward sub-districts. Using regression discontinuity and panel data of all schools in
India, I find that there was a significant expansion in the total number of schools, number of girls’
schools, and residential schools for girls, in the educationally backward areas. But being classified
as educationally backward did not lead to a significant effect on either the female literacy rate or
the gender gap in literacy rate. To achieve a quicker solution to low levels of literacy, alternative
cost effective methods compared to large scale infrastructure programs can be explored.
Finally, Chapter 3 titled “Spatial Analysis of an Education Program and Literacy in India” ex-
plores the presence of spatial dependency for studying the association between an education pro-
gram and literacy. To do this, I use data from a nation-wide education program in India which
involved building schools and increasing the accessibility of education to girls. The program tar-
geted geographical districts that were educationally backward or had a low rate of rural female
literacy. The paper finds significant spatial correlation in the educational backwardness of districts
and in the outcome of interest, change in rural female literacy rate. To account for the spatial
dependency, I fit a spatially distributed error model (SDEM). The SDEM estimates suggest a 0.08
ii
percentage point increase in the rural female literacy rate and a 0.02 percentage point decrease
in the gender gap in literacy rate with a one point increase in the educational backwardness of a
district. The SDEM estimates are similar to the estimates from a spatially blind model, and there is
no additional influence of the program received by the neighboring districts on the change in rural
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Chapter 1
EFFECT OF POLITICAL QUOTAS ON CANDIDATE
ATTRIBUTES AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC
GOODS
1.1 Introduction
To address the underrepresentation of women and people belonging to certain ethnicities, castes,
and other minority groups in politics, policymakers often turn to quotas. Quotas increase the rep-
resentation of political candidates from the underrepresented identity. But these policies remain
controversial because of fears that the quality of political candidates could fall, and economic
development could decrease.1 To address this controversy, in this paper I study the following
questions: whether quotas lead to political candidates with different attributes, and whether the
presence of quotas affect the provision of public goods.
To assess the effect of quotas, I use political quotas which have been in place for the past seven
decades in the largest democracy, India. The quota exists for the historically disadvantaged groups,
the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who comprise a quarter of India’s population. I use
quotas in state elections where approximately a quarter of the total 4,120 electoral districts in India
are “reserved”.2 Reservation of an electoral district for Scheduled Castes (Tribes) stipulates only
citizens belonging to the Scheduled Castes (Tribes) can stand for elections from the district. The
winner from the election in a district is the elected official or the district’s representative in the state
legislative assembly. Reservation status thus guarantees representation of these castes and tribes in
influential positions, as members of the legislative body of the state government.
Estimating the causal effect of quotas can be challenging as the assignment of quotas are not
1Affirmative action policies in college admissions or employment raise similar concerns; that they may lead to
candidates or employees of lower qualifications or ability (Bagde et al., 2016; Holzer and Neumark, 1999). Affirma-
tive action policies are controversial because, by stipulating that minorities must be represented, members of other
groups have fewer opportunities to gain admission to prestigious higher education institutions or to assume leadership
positions within organizations, for example.
2In India, members of the central government are selected in national elections; the representatives of the state
legislature are elected through state elections; and representatives at the lower level of government are elected through
local elections.
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random, leading to endogeneity issues. The presence of quotas can be correlated with other char-
acteristics of electoral districts, such as being economically poor. But, the assignment of reserva-
tion status to constituencies by the Delimitation Commission in India provides a suitable empirical
setting for tackling the endogeneity problem. The reservation status of an electoral district (or con-
stituency) depends on the population share of the reserved groups. Although there is no explicit
population cutoff, I exploit the procedure of reservation in a novel way to establish a discontinuous
relationship between the share of the reserved population and the reservation status of constituen-
cies. I implement a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of quota.
The primary findings on how the use of quotas affects the attributes of candidates for office:
Candidates standing for election from scheduled caste constituencies are less likely to be criminals
(4.4 percentage points); they have lower assets (0.14 million USD or 76 percent lower); and they
have similar education levels to candidates in constituencies not reserved for the scheduled castes.3
Comparing the estimates with statistics on attributes for the overall population, the results suggest
that the difference observed in the attributes of political candidates do not merely reflect differences
in the attributes of the populations of reserved and unreserved castes. Second, in scheduled caste
constituencies, more women seek election (5 percentage points more than in non scheduled caste
constituencies), and more women win (8 percentage points). Thus, caste quotas not only increased
political representation from the targeted population, but also women.
I also explore whether the results hold for candidates who differ in their party affiliation, in-
cumbency status, and winning status. I find the difference in attributes across reservation status
of constituencies is higher among candidates affiliated with political parties compared to candi-
dates who contest independently (35 percent of candidates are independents). The differences
in attributes is also observed for the non-incumbents, who may not have the advantage that are
typically associated with incumbency. The effect is more pronounced among the strongest candi-
dates, the winners, who are also the elected official. The phenomenon of candidates with criminal
records also winning elections can be because other potential candidates for the same office also
have criminal records, or because voters prefer some other attribute of the candidate, such as caste.
Using data from a voters opinion survey, I do find citizens from unreserved castes and tribes care
more about the caste or religion of the candidate than citizens from the reserved groups do. Thus,
the possibility of caste-biased voting in the unreserved constituencies can lead to selection and
winning of criminal candidates (Banerjee and Pande, 2007; Besley et al., 2005).
3As a measure for desirable attributes, such as honesty or competence, I use information on criminal charges,
education level, and wealth of candidates.
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To explore whether areas that are bound by quotas have lower provision of public goods, I use the
data on facilities in all villages in 2011. The results do not indicate a significant difference caused
by reservation status in the availability of facilities, such as schools, hospitals, roads, and banks
across constituencies. The size of the estimates imply, any effect greater than a decrease in the
availability of facilities in 4 percent of villages (or three to four villages) in a reserved constituency
can be ruled out. There is also no evidence of a difference in the growth of facilities for the re-
served constituencies in the 2001-2011 period. This is in line with findings of similar insignificant
effects of caste quotas on economic development for the period of 1971-2001 (Jensenius, 2015).
Thus, the reserved constituencies are on par with similar constituencies that are unreserved, at least
in availability of the basic facilities.
This paper relates to several literature. First, this paper contributes to the literature on the effect
of affirmative action policies on quality of candidates. Most studies in the affirmative action liter-
ature have focussed on the effect of policies in college admissions and employment opportunities
(Holzer and Neumark, 1999; Bagde et al., 2016). This paper studies how political quotas causally
affect attributes of politicians who are in a crucial position of managing a state. Although the at-
tributes that define a “good” politician is not clear, to the extent that having criminal charges can
be considered a bad attribute and the level of education a good attribute, then the reserved con-
stituencies are better off in this respect.4 Another issue in the affirmative action literature is that
affirmative action policies targeting one minority group may displace people from other underrep-
resented groups (Bertrand et al., 2010). But, this paper suggests that may not always be the case, as
caste-based political quotas in fact led to more representation of the other underrepresented group
in politics, women.
Second, this paper also builds on the literature on importance of identity (such as gender, caste,
or ethnicity) and characteristics of a politician. Several studies have used quotas to estimate the
effect of the identity of a political leader (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004b,a; Bardhan et al., 2010;
Dunning and Nilekani, 2013). Other papers have pointed out that the effectivenss of a leader may
also depend on his other attributes, such as honesty, integrity, and ability (Besley, 2005; Besley
et al., 2005). In addition, recent studies have emphasised the phenomenon of selection of candi-
dates on the basis of character (Bernheim and Kartik, 2014). This paper also suggests evidence of
selection of citizens who seek elections and also selection of candidates by parties on the basis of
4Existing evidence imply election of criminal politicians affect development negatively (Prakash et al., 2014;
Chemin, 2012), they under utilize development funds and who have lower attendance rates in meetings (Gehring et al.,
2015). Educated leaders can contribute to higher growth (Besley et al., 2011) but may not affect education outcomes
(Lahoti and Sahoo, 2017).
3
the candidate’s attributes.
Finally, this paper adds to the few studies on the effect of political quotas in state legislatures on
provision of public goods (Jensenius, 2015; Min and Uppal, 2011). Various studies have focussed
on quotas in the local village council where the assignment of quotas is randomized, unlike the
quotas in the state legislature. In a large and decentralised system of government, as in India, the
state legislature plays a crucial role, such as being responsible for law making, providing resources
to the local government, making government schemes available to citizens, and to use the con-
stituency development fund for ensuring development in the constituencies. The closest paper to
this paper is Jensenius (2015). The paper uses propensity score method to find no impact of reser-
vation for Scheduled Castes on several development indicators in the period of 1971-2001. Using
new districts with data after the latest redistricting, I find a similar null result for a wider range of
village facilities by implementing a regression discontinuity design. I find an insignificant result
on reservation for Scheduled Tribes as well.5
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides some background on political
representation in India and the process of reservation of constituencies. Section 1.3 describes the
theoretical expectations and conceptual framework for the effect of quotas. Section 1.4 explains
the research design and data. Section 1.5 presents and discusses the results on the effect of quotas.
Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 Quotas and Elections in India
Quotas are a form of mandated political representation for underrepresented populations.6 Po-
litical quotas in the state elections in India exist for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
5The literature has found different effect of quotas for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. For example, Chin
and Prakash (2011) find no impact on poverty when the number of assembly constituencies reserved for Scheduled
Castes in a state increases, but do find a decrease in poverty on increasing the share of seats reserved for Scheduled
Tribe. Whereas, Krishnan (2007) find leaders from Scheduled Castes improve primary schooling facilities, but finds
no significant effect for leaders from the Scheduled Tribes. Pande (2003) finds a positive effect of reservation for
Scheduled Tribes on welfare spending, and a positive effect of reservation for Scheduled Castes on job quotas.
6There can be various kinds of quotas based on their nature of restriction (candidate list vis-a-vis reserved seats).
See (Bird, 2014; Htun, 2004; UNDP, 2012) for details and case studies on political quotas.
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which comprise a quarter of the population (16.6 percent and 8.6 percent, Census of India 2011).
Such castes and tribes have been historically disadvantaged, with people, sweepers and cobblers,
for instance, treated as lower caste or untouchables. The lower castes have faced discrimination
and exploitation by the upper castes for generations. By contrast, tribal communities traditionally
resided in forest areas, which led to their geographical and cultural isolation. Having such a history
of oppression, members of such castes and tribes may lack the confidence to voice their opinion
or to seek a political career. It would also be difficult for them to compete with candidates from
the upper castes. Therefore, as a measure of positive discrimination, the constitution implemented
political quotas for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes after the independence of India (1947).7
Quotas in the state legislative assembly, which exists in the form of reserving electoral districts
for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, guarantee seats for them in the state legislative assembly. The
members of the state legislative assembly (known as MLA) are elected in state elections, which
occur every five years. The state elections use a “first-past-the-post” system; several candidates run
for office in an electoral district, and the candidate with the highest number of votes is the winner
or the MLA. There are a total of 4,120 electoral districts or assembly constituencies; thus elections
from the 4,120 districts lead to 4,120 MLAs. Reservation of an electoral district for Scheduled
castes (or Tribes) mandates that only candidates belonging to the Scheduled castes (or Tribes) are
allowed to run for office from that district. However, voting within reserved districts takes place
in the same way voting takes place in all districts; that is, voting is open to everyone, not just to
those from reserved groups. Approximately a quarter of the 4,120 districts are reserved; hence
reservation means that a quarter of the MLAs in India are represented by members of scheduled
castes and tribes.
Seats in the state legislative assembly increase the representation of scheduled castes and tribes
in an influential position. The state legislature has significant power over law making, and many
matters related to issues, such as agriculture, local governments, and police. It also participates
with the central government in decisions related to matters such as education, and marriage. The
members of the state legislative assemblies participate in the legislative meetings and make impor-
tant decisions for the state. They are responsible for ensuring development in their constituencies,
suggesting projects for implementation to bureaucrats, and for providing access to different govern-
7Quotas for the Scheduled castes and tribes also exist in the local and national government. In state and national
elections electoral districts are reserved, whereas for local elections it is implemented as reservation of seats in the
local council. There also exists quota for women in the local elections, but the proposal of quotas for women in state
and national government is still under discussion. Several other affirmative action policies for the Scheduled castes and
Tribes exist in the education and employment sectors in India. To address atrocities against the lower castes, special
courts were established under the Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989 (Girard, 2016).
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mental schemes to people. They have complete access to the constituency development fund, the
MLA-Local Area Development fund (MLA-LAD). Additionally, they can nominate members for
other bodies, such as block development committees (Wilkinson, 2006) and they have the power
to transfer bureaucrats (Iyer and Mani, 2011; Nath, 2015).8
1.2.2 Process of Redistricting and Reservation in India
The Delimitation Commission defines the boundaries of electoral districts (or constituencies)
during redistricting. Redistricting or delimitation divides states into equally populous constituen-
cies using data from the latest census, and is supposed to occur every 10 years.9 The first redis-
tricting took place in 1953, followed by the second and third in 1961 and 1971. But, there was
no redistricting in the period 1971-2007. Evidence suggests that the freeze in redistricting was
not because of any political manipulation (Bhavnani, 2015). The reason for the freeze was to not
punish states achieving lower population growth with lower representation in the state and national
government. Hence, the latest redistricting in 2007 occurred after a gap of three decades. Figure
A.1 shows the latest redistricting led to a significant change in the boundaries of constituencies. 10
The Commssion also decides the reservation status of constituencies during redistricing. Fig-
ure 1.1 presents the distribution of constituencies based on their reservation status. Assembly
constituencies are classified according to their reservation status into three groups: unreserved or
General (GEN), reserved for the Scheduled Castes (SC), and reserved for the Scheduled Tribes
(ST). A constituency that is either a SC or a ST constituency is a reserved constituency in Figure
1.1.
The Delimitation Commission uses the following procedure to determine the allocation of re-
served constituencies to states and the reservation status of each constituency. The total number
of constituencies reserved is proportional to the population share of the reserved group in India.
Likewise, the number of reserved constituencies in a state is proportional to the population share
8In this paper, I focus on quotas in the state legislative assembly. I also confirm some results for quotas in the
national elections, which elect members for the lower house of India’s Parliament or Lok Sabha.
9For the national elections, the country is divided into 543 electoral districts known as parliamentary constituen-
cies. A parliamentary constituency is composed of several assembly constituencies. An assembly constituency always
lies completely within a parliamentary constituency.
10Sources of maps for Figure A.1: Old constituencies from Sandip Sukhtankar and Manasa Patnam, New con-
stituencies from Devdatta Tengshe of Datameet. The states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Jhark-
hand, Jammu and Kashmir were not delimited in 2007.
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of the reserved group in the state. Thus, a state with a higher fraction of the reserved population
will have a higher proportion of reserved constituencies.
To maintain geographic heterogeneity of reservation for scheduled castes, there is an extra step
of allocation of SC constituencies across administrative districts.11 The number of SC constituen-
cies (or seats) entitled to a district is equal to the total number of SC constituencies allocated to the
state multiplied by the relative population share of scheduled castes in the district. But, this number
can be a fraction and is thus called the predicted number of SC constituencies for the district. Fig-
ure 1.2 shows the rule followed by the commission for final allocation of SC constituencies across
districts, which has to be an integer, and is dtermined as a step function of the predicted number
of SC constituencies for the district. Following the allocation of constituencies, the next step is
to determine the reservation status of the constituencies. To do this, the Delimitation Commission
reserves constituencies with the highest population share of Scheduled Castes in the district, and
highest population share of Scheduled Tribes in the state. I explain the procedure in the empirical
section and using examples in section A.2.1 of the data appendix. The reservation procedure forms
the basis of my empirical strategy.
1.3 Theories and Conceptual Framework
1.3.1 Potential Impact of Political Quotas
Whether political quotas serve the purpose of benefiting the minorities or worsen the situation
for the entire constituency remains controversial. One of the direct effects of quotas is that they
guarantee politicians of a particular identity, such as gender or caste. Several studies have evalu-
ated the importance of identity of the politician for election or economic outcomes. For example,
the gender of the candidate is believed to have favorable development outcomes in interests of the
representative gender or the population (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004b; Clots-Figueras, 2011,
2012; Iyer et al., 2012). But, reserving the position of chief in the local government for women
led to a decrease in targeting of resources towards other underrepresented groups (Bardhan et al.,
2010). Under caste and tribal quotas at the local level, where the chief of the local government
belonged to one of these minorities, the evidence has been mixed; from weak distributive effects
(Dunning and Nilekani, 2013) to postive benefits (Bardhan et al., 2010; Chattopadhyay and Duflo,
11The Scheduled Tribes population is concentrated in some states and is approximately half of the Scheduled Castes
population.
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2004a). The religion of the political candidate has also been found to be important in influenc-
ing health and education outcomes (Bhalotra et al., 2014).12 These studies are based on citizen-
candidate models where the identity of the politician might influence his or her policy position or
policy preference.
But, it has also been argued that the identity of the politician does not matter if political party
influence is higher (Jensenius, 2015). Likewise, it has been argued that because politicians care
about their own interests and careers, even elected officials who are members of the representative
castes or tribes are unlikely to pay special attention to their own groups because their incentive
is to try to please the majority population and, thus, the voter pool needed for them to remain in
power.
Fear of quotas leading to negative effects is based on several hypotheses, such as that quo-
tas could result in candidates who are ill-suited for the responsibilities of being a leader. Such
candidates would have less bargaining power, be less effective in attracting resources for their con-
stituencies. Such a situation would result in a worse allocation of resources to all the people in the
constituency and would affect development. Another hypothesis put forward is that candidates in
a reserved constituency could experience lower competition because people from the unreserved
categories are ruled out from standing for elections. The leader from a reserved constituency can
also take his powers for granted because the presence of the quota gives him a greater chance of
remaining in power.
Similar concerns have been raised about affirmative action policies in education or employment.
Critics have argued that such policies might lead to admission of students or hiring of employees
who are ill prepared for the position, and this would be detrimental to their careers. However,
Holzer and Neumark (1999) find that employees hired under affirmative action had lower educa-
tional qualifications but not lower performance. Using affirmative action policy in engineering
colleges in India, Bagde et al. (2016) did not find any evidence of a mismatch between students
and colleges. In case of political quotas, this question is important, as having people who are in-
competent to be politicians may not only be detrimental for their own career but also for citizens
12Such identity of the politician could potentially influence outcomes through many channels. Examples of such
channels include higher complaints by women in presence of women leader about goods they prefer more (Chattopad-
hyay and Duflo, 2004b), and bargaining power of the legislator (Pande, 2003). Similarly, having MLAs from the same
community can lead to a decrease in the cost of complaining for people from these communities, either directly or
through local officials. MLAs have access to funds for development, and are in a position to discuss issues that require
attention in the state legislative meetings. Furthermore, MLAs themselves can be ministers of different departments,
such as health, railway, and education, putting them in greater positions of power.
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of the state.
Apart from identities such as gender, caste, or ethnicity that a person is born with, there has
been recent emphasis on character of the politician. As mentioned in (Besley, 2005; Akerlof and
Kranton, 2000) a politician has many characteristics that identify him and determine his quality.
Characteristics such as criminality and level of education of politicians has also been observed
to affect development (Prakash et al., 2014; Chemin, 2012; Gehring et al., 2015; Besley et al.,
2011; Lahoti and Sahoo, 2017). Character of the politician is important for political selection of
the candidate as well (Besley et al., 2005; Bernheim and Kartik, 2014). However, the characteris-
tics that are essential for a “good” politician might be difficult to define. These can be subjective
characteristics such as charisma, personality, intelligence, integrity; or objective measures such as
education, income, experience (Murray, 2015). In addition, quality of the candidate who is finally
in office might be affected by the institutional setting and the method of political selection (Besley,
2005). To explore if quotas could lead to politicians of different charcteristics, I present a concep-
tual framework in the next section.
1.3.2 Conceptual Framework
The process of election in India and the final selection of a candidate in office can be understood
using the following stages:
Stage 1: Some citizens of India decide to run for political office from a constituency. The deci-
sion of a citizen to run depends on the cost (ci) and return (Ri) from running.
Stage 2: Parties nominate candidates of type ti, where ti=t(x1,x2,x3, ..), a function of different
attributes of the candidate x1,x2, .. and others. Some examples of the attributes x1,x2, .. are wealth,
popularity, ability or education level. A party may require some minimum qualification for a can-
didate to be eligible, ti >= t. A candidate has a value of V (ti)w on winning and V (ti)l on losing to
a party, where the probability of win for the candidate is p(ti). For the purpose of generality, I am
not assuming any restriction on the values of V (ti)l , and there can be situations in which the values
are negative, positive or zero. Simialrly, not making assumptions regarding the relation between
V (ti)w and V (ti)l , or for value of the candidate to the party when ti = t.
While selecting candidates, the parties would internalize preferences of the voters, but might
also have its own set of desirable characteristics, such as loyalty to the party (Besley, 2005). The t
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could be institutional restrictions for contesting elections, but also minimum criteria that a political
party may have for the different attributes of a candidate or the x′s. Once a candidate meets the
minimum criteria, the party would want to select a candidate with the maximum expected value,
E(V (ti)), where E(V (ti)) = p(ti)V (ti)w +(1− p(ti))V (ti)l .
Stage 3: Several candidates contest from different political parties in a constituency and voters
vote for their preferred candidate.
Finally, the candidate with highest vote is the winner or the Member of Legislative Assembly
(MLA) who is responsible for functioning of the state government and for development in the con-
stituency. This framework can also be generalized to other democracies that have a similar process
of election.
Given that these stages would determine the outcome of elections for constituencies, then quotas
could influence the mechanism of an election in one or more of the stages, and we can expect that
this could lead to politician with different attributes in office. With the implementation of quotas,
the difference lies in the fact that some constituencies gain a status of being restricted to citizens
only belonging to certain castes or tribes. Several studies have assumed that the cost of contesting
or the benefit from winning is different for people from the underrepresented group (Chattopad-
hyay and Duflo, 2004b; Besley et al., 2005). Such restriction could alter the incentive of the agents
involved in the above stages. For example, reservation could decrease the cost of contesting elec-
tions (ci), or increase the return from contesting elections (Ri) for a candidate from the reserved
group.
Similarly, the decision to contest may depend on being selected by politicial parties. During
selection of candidates by parties, if belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes is one of the x
or the attribute for the type of a candidate, then this does not remain an unconstrained parameter
in the reserved constituencies anymore. Caste of the candidate can be an attribute for selection
by parties because it can also be a determinant of voter’s preference. For example, voters could
prefer candidates belonging to their own caste. Parties may internalize such preferences during
their selection of candidates.
Therefore, whether candidates of similar attributes will emerge from a reserved or general con-
stituency will depend on the distribution of ti for the population and the reserved groups, or on the
distribution of ti for citizens who want to stand for elections in Stage 1. The selection will also
depend on the selection of candidates by parties from the reserved and unreserved constituencies
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in Stage 2, and ultimately the candidates chosen by voters in Stage 3. Even in absence of quotas,
the type of candidate selected could be different based on other factors, such as the population
composition of the reserved or unreserved constituencies. Hence, to causally estimate the effect
of reservation on otherwise similar constituencies, I use the empirical framework described in the
next subsection.
1.4 Empirical Framework
In this section I describe the empirical strategy used to identify the causal effect of quota. The
challenge in estimating the effect of quotas is the issue of endogeneity, since the reserved con-
stituencies differ from the unreserved constituencies in characteristics other than the reservation
status. But, the procedure of redistricting and assignment of reservation status to constituencies in
India provides a quasi-natural experiment setting. I exploit this to set up a regression discontinuity
design (RD). I also describe the data sources used for the exercise and confirm the RD assumptions.
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy: Regression Discontinuity
The Delimitation Commission reserves constituencies based on the population share of the re-
served group. Using the procedure followed by the Commission, I am able to establish a discon-
tinuous relation between the reservation status and population share of the reserved group in the
constituency. To achieve this, I rank constituencies based on the population share of Scheduled
Tribes within a state and Scheduled Castes within a district in a descending order. A rank of one
implies highest population share of the reserved group. The number of constituencies reserved
in the district for these castes (and in the state for these tribes) acts as the cutoff rank. Hence,
constituencies with rank less than or equal to the cutoff have a reservation status of one.13 Figure
1.3 shows this for reservation of SC constituencies. Instead of using the discrete variable rank of
a constituency, I use the continuous variable population share of Scheduled Castes as the assign-
ment variable, and the population share of Scheduled Castes in the last constituency reserved (one
with the cutoff rank) as the cutoff. Hence, all constituencies with percentage of Scheduled Castes
population higher than the cutoff have a reservation status of one. I normalize the cutoff to zero.
All other points are differences of the population share of Scheduled Castes from the cutoff, which
I refer to as the deviation of the percentage of Scheduled Castes population. I follow a similar
13I explain the procedure in the form of an algorithm in section A.2.1 of the data appendix.
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procedure for reservation of ST constituencies.
Figure 1.4 presents the relationship between the reservation of a constituency for Scheduled
Tribes and the normalized population share of Scheduled Castes. The figure shows the probability
of reservation of a constituency for Scheduled Castes increases by 0.95 on crossing the cutoff and
not one. This arises due to a few exceptional rules. For example, a constituency may be eligible for
reservation for both Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to a high relative population share
of the groups. In such cases, the constituency is reserved for Scheduled Tribes.14 Additionally,
to distribute SC constituencies over the state, the Commission avoids spatially contiguous con-
stituencies for reservation of Scheduled Castes. On observing the map of assembly constituencies,
this seems to be an explanation for some cases. To illustrate, in the state of Andhra Pradesh, the
constituency Addanki although eligible for reservation, did not receive reservation status. This de-
cision was made because Addanki is adjacent to Santhanuthalapadu (shown in Figure A.2), which
has the highest percentage of Scheduled Caste populations in the Prakasam district. As a result,
Santhanuthalapadu was reserved, Addanki was skipped, and Yerragondapalem was reserved in-
stead.15
Figure 1.4 also shows that there are far more unreserved constituencies compared to reserved
constituencies, leading to fewer points on the right. Also, there are fewer constituencies with ex-
treme percentages of Scheduled Castes populations. Table 1.1 provides the first stage estimates
for SC reservation and the estimate obtained is 0.95. The estimate remains similar under various
specifications, and choice of bandwidths. As shown in Figure 1.5, on crossing the threshold for
Scheduled Tribes population, the probability of a constituency being reserved for Scheduled Tribes
jumps from zero to one.
14An example of this is the constituency of Habibpur in the state of West Bengal. It has the highest Scheduled
Castes population in the district of Maldaha, but because of its high scheduled tribe population in the state, the district
received reservation for such tribes. Another situation is when a district is not assigned any reserved seat for scheduled
castes, even though, according to the rule, it must receive one. This can happen if the total number of seats a state
should receive is less than the sum of the individual entitlements of the districts. For example, based on the population
share of Schedule Castes relative to other states, the state of Haryana has an allocation of 17 scheduled caste seats.
But, the number of districts in the state is 19. Based on the rule for assignment within districts, each of the 18 districts
should receive one scheduled caste constituency. Thus, the district of Mahendragarh with the lowest scheduled caste
population share does not receive any such seat. I have excluded districts with no scheduled caste seats; hence, these
districts will not cause the fuzziness we see in the RD. But if a constituency was not reserved for similar reasons when
a district should receive more than one reserved AC, it was included.
15Yerragondapalem had the second highest percentage of Scheduled Caste populations in the Prakasam district
among the unreserved constituencies, and constituency Parchur had the highest. But, Parchur was spatially adjacent
to Santhanuthalapadu as well.
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I am interested in estimating the effect of reservation on the outcome variables of interest: at-
tributes of political candidates and the level of public goods in the constituency.
Figure 1.5 shows the reservation status for ST constituencies changed deterministically at the
population cutoff. Thus, the treatment effect for ST reservation can be estimated using a sharp
regression discontinuity design. The regression specification can be represented by the following
equations:
Yi = α +βDi + f (Xi)+ εi (1.1)
Di =
{
1 if Xi >= 0
0 if Xi < 0
(1.2)
where Di=1 implies constituency i is reserved for Scheduled Tribes, Xi: Difference in percentage
of Scheduled Tribes population from the cutoff, Yi is an outcome variable of interest.
But for SC reservation, Di is not a deterministic function of Xi. There is a discontinuous change
in probability of the treatment status (Di) at the cutoff, that is
lim
x↑c
Pr[Di = 1|X = x] 6= lim
x↓c
Pr[Di = 0|X = x] (1.3)
but the change in the probability of treatment is less than one. Thus, the treatment effect for SC
reservation is estimated using a fuzzy RD design. Estimation of a fuzzy RD is similar to the two
stage least-squares method as shown by the following equations:
Yi = α +βDi + f (Xi)+ εi (1.4)
Di = α1 +β1Zi +g(Xi)+µi (1.5)
Zi = 1(Xi >= 0) (1.6)
where Di=1 implies constituency i is reserved for Scheduled Castes, Xi is the difference in per-
centage of Scheduled Castes population from the cutoff, where the cutoff has been normalised to
be zero. Yi is the percentage of villages in the constituency with the public good or the different
attributes of a candidate. Zi: dummy variable which takes the value of one to the right of the cutoff
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and zero to the left of the cutoff. Zi is used as the instrument for the endogenous variable Di.
I follow a nonparametric method of estimating the causal effect at the cutoff using local linear
regression (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). The coefficient of interest β for the fuzzy design can then be
estimated by considering only observations close to the cutoff (c) as below:
β =
limx↑c E[Y |X = x]− limx↓c E[Y |X = x]
limx↑c E[D|X = x]− limx↓c E[D|X = x]
(1.7)
Because the probability of being reserved for Scheduled Tribes jumps from zero to one at the
threshold, the jump in the outcome variable is the average treatment effect, that is
β = lim
x↑c
E[Y |X = x]− lim
x↓c
E[Y |X = x] (1.8)
To balance the tradeoff between bias and precision of the estimates, I consider observations within
the Calonico et al. (2014) optimal bandwidth (CCT). I report the bias-corrected robust estimates
that measure the average treatment effect at the threshold. For the main analysis of the paper, I
focus on constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes.
1.4.2 Data and Summary Statistics
Redistricting data: I use the delimitation reports for each state to construct a dataset with the
population and reservation status of constituencies. These reports from the Election Commission
provide an accurate measure of population for the constituency. They contain the total population,
the population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the reservation status, and the adminis-
trative area of each constituency. For the analysis, I exclude the following observations from the
sample: states that were not delimited in 2008, union territories in India that do not have legislative
assemblies, and Delhi (which is a union territory but also the capital of India). This yields 3,397
constituencies (of the 4,120 possible constituencies) in 21 states. The current identification strategy
is made possible by the availability of these delimitation data and can be used for future research.16
16The population of the constituencies for the earlier delimitations is not made publicly available. The other source
of population is the Census of India. However, it is difficult to use the Census to obtain constituency-level populations
because the Census provides population data only for administrative divisions.
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Data on Affidavits: To study the effect of quotas on the attributes of candidates, I use data
on the candidate affidavits. In the wake of a 2002 Supreme Court ruling, all candidates seeking
election to political office in India must file personal affidavits. The affidavits contain information
on the gender, education level, criminal charges, and the assets and liabilities of the candidates.17 I
complement this with data on state elections in India. These contain names of political candidates
from different assembly constituencies and the total number of votes they received for all state
elections from 1977 to 2016.18
Table 1.2 summarizes the data on affidavits.19 The table shows that political candidates from
the reserved and unreserved constituencies differ significantly on most attributes. Candidates from
general or unreserved constituencies have approximately thrice the assets compared to candidates
from the reserved constituencies. The number of criminal charges including serious crimes is
higher on average for candidates from general constituencies. Representation of women in all
constituencies in state elections is strikingly low; Males represent 90 percent of candidates from
reserved constituencies, and 94 percent of the candidates from unreserved constituencies. Fewer
contestants view for office in reserved constituencies. There is no significant difference in the ed-
ucation level of candidates from the two types of constituencies.
Voters’ Survey: To understand voters’ preference about politicians and public facilities, I use
the the Daksh voter participation survey of 2014. The survey has 238,694 respondents. These data
are unique for both the sample size and the extensive set of questions used.20 The respondents
provided their opinions on the performance of the leader, and the factors that influence their vot-
17Source: ADR affidavit data crawled from Myneta.com and cleansed by Trivedi Centre for Political Data (TCPD).
I thank Gilles Verniers, Rajkamal Singh, and the TCPD team for providing the data. I add details on incumbents and
perform some other checks from the Myneta.com website. Details on the filing of affidavits and their veracity can be
found in Bhavnani (2012); Vaishnav (2012); Prakash et al. (2014)
18The source of the data for the years 1977 to 2012 is Bhavnani, Rikhil R., 2014, India National and State Election
Dataset”, http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/26526 Harvard Dataverse Network [Distributor] V1 [Version]. I use these
data to construct the margin in elections, to document other election outcomes of those constituencies, and to conduct
various cross checks. For post-2012, I use various web-based sources.
19Out of the sample of 3,397 constituencies, the data could be matched for 3,378 constituencies. I have considered
affidavits of candidates for state elections from 2009 to 2014 for all the states in my sample that had at least one
election after the redistricting. Recent data are available for some states that had a second round of elections after
2014; these data, however, do not have all the variables included in the previous data. The estimates for the common
variables remain similar when including the recent data.
20Daksh India conducted the survey, and I obtained the data from Datameet, a community of Data Science and
Open data enthusiasts. The survey was regarding the Member of Parliaments (MPs) instead of MLAs. Nevertheless,
the survey provides evidence to some extent about the perception of politicians.
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ing decisions. Panel A of Table 1.3 shows the candidate characteristics that survey respondents
consider to be important. I represent the data by whether the respondent belong to the reserved
groups. People from unreserved groups consider the caste or religion of the candidate more impor-
tant compared to respondents from the reserved groups. People from general caste also seemed to
value distribution of gifts by the candidate which is illegal.
Panel B of Table 1.3 summarizes information on how voters ranked the importance of differ-
ent public goods and services, such as education, health, and agriculture. Participants indicated
whether they considered certain services to be of High, Low or Medium importance.21The table
shows that approximately half of the respondents thought these were of high importance. The
difference between the opinion of people from the reserved and unreserved group was significant,
especially given the large sample size. More people from the Scheduled Castes and Tribes con-
sidered basic facilities of education, health, agriculture, and electricity to be of high importance in
comparison to people from general castes. The table shows the system of job reservation which
exists for the Scheduled Castes and Tribes in India, was of lesser importance to people from the
general caste, who do not benefit from it.
Census Data: As a measure of public good provision, I use the 2001 and 2011 Census data,
which contain information on facilities for all villages in India. This exercise required linking
several datasets. This process was not straightforward. First, mapping administrative divisions to
constituencies in India has been a challenge in the past, and several studies have followed different
approximation methods.22 Some papers have recently used mapping between villages and the old
constituencies (Jensenius, 2015; Asher and Novosad, 2017). But, with new boundaries of con-
stituencies, the villages have to be mapped to the new constituencies.23 Second, the Census 2001
and 2011 data use different village codes. After several rounds of matching and cleaning, the final
sample of 2,801 constituencies is used for the analysis on public goods.
21The Daksh voter perception survey included many questions under each category. For example, under the cat-
egory of agriculture, the questions addressed the importance of agriculture loans, prices of agriculture commodities,
irrigation, subsidies for fertilizers, and so on. To summarize the information, I create a dummy indicating “High im-
portance” for each variable and find the average for the entire category. I followed the same procedure for the other
categories.
22For example, Blakeslee (2013) aggregates the values at the subdistrict level and maps these to Parliamentary
constituencies.
23I sincerely thank Raphael Susewind for sharing the 2011 mapping between villages, and the new constituencies.
The data are protected under the Open Data Commons Open Database license. I followed several procedures to check
the consistency and correctness of the data, comparing them with other publications of the Delimitation Commission.
See section A.2.2 of data appendix for details on the cleaning and modifications of the data.
16
The Census data provides information on facilities available to the population living in the vil-
lages of India. The data contain information on whether a village has a facility, such as a primary
school, a middle school, or a health center. I define aggregate variables based on the different fa-
cilities. For example, the variable “Middle School or higher” in Table 1.4 is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one if a village has a middle school, or a secondary school, or a senior secondary
school; otherwise, the value is zero. I follow a similar strategy for other variables. I then aggregate
the data at the constituency level to find the percentage of villages in a constituency with a facility.
Table 1.4 compares the average level of village facilities by reservation status of the constituen-
cies; 57.6 percent of the villages in a general constituency have a middle school or above and 36.2
percent of the villages have a health center or a hospital.24 The reserved constituencies have a lower
level of the public goods, but the difference between a general and a scheduled caste constituency
is small. There has been convergence in the level of facilities, and the gap between the general and
reserved constituencies has reduced in comparison to data from earlier Censuses (Banerjee and
Somanathan, 2007; Blakeslee, 2013).
I also investigate the growth in the facilities for the 2001-2011 period by constructing a panel
of villages. Doing so was difficult because the boundaries of constituencies had changed due to
the latest redistricting. Many villages now belonged to a different constituency, meaning that the
new constituencies formed had different composition of villages than those in 2001. To solve this,
I calculate the level of public goods for the new constituencies in 2001 with their current composi-
tion of villages.25
1.4.3 Regression Discontinuity Assumptions
The RD analysis is valid under certain assumptions: there must be no manipulation of the treat-
ment variables around the cutoff; the covariates are balanced across the cutoff; and the assignment
variable is continuous (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). I provide evidence to support that each of these
assumptions is satisfied. The results are provided in the appendix.
24In the 2011 Census, almost all villages (approximately 95 percent) report having a primary school after the
government’s effort to ensure universal primary education in India.
25This provides a hypothetical estimate of what would have been the level of public goods in these constituencies
if they had existed in their current form in 2001. I only consider variables that were present in both the Censuses, and
aggregate the variables in a way to make them comparable. This is an approximation because some of the villages that
are now mapped to the new constituencies experienced a different administration in 2001.
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Manipulation of the treatment variable would imply changing the percentage of the Scheduled
Castes or Scheduled Tribes population relative to the cutoff to affect reservation status for some
constituencies. This is unlikely for several reasons. Firstly, the process of delimitation happens
after the population Census has been recorded and published. Redistricting is performed by the
Delimitation Commission which has no connection to the Census Division of India. The pop-
ulation numbers are used for many other purposes apart from reservation of constituencies, thus
suspecting that they will be changed for the purpose of determining reservation status is farfetched.
Second, manipulating the variable for the population share of a scheduled caste or tribe would be
difficult, requiring perfect manipulation of the reserved population or the total population. More-
over, accomplishing this would also require manipulating the variable relative to the population of
other constituencies to address the relative ranking of constituencies and, hence, their reservation
status. Another way in which there could be manipulation would be through manipulating the elec-
toral boundaries or gerrymandering. This too seems unlikely since the Delimitation Commission
responsible for the delimitation is an independent organization comprised of members without any
political connection or affiliation. The latest redistricting was mostly politically neutral (Iyer and
Reddy, 2013). To draw the boundaries for constituencies in a district, the commission proceeds
in a zig zag manner starting from the north, proceeding northwest and then turning south. Addi-
tionally, the shape of constituencies as seen in Figure 1.1 reduces suspicions about gerrymandering.
The second assumption requires that constituencies do not differ in other characteristics discon-
tinuously around the cutoff. I test for whether covariates (such as population size, population of
other castes, average number of households, and the facilities) were balanced in the pre-period
using data from the Census of 2001. Figure A.3 in appendix presents the discontinuity plots for
the covariates. The plots do not show any significant discontinuities around the cutoff for any of
the variables. The final assumption of the assignment variable being continuous holds true because
the percentage of the population of scheduled castes and tribes are continuous in nature.
1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Effect of Reservation on Characteristic of Candidates
Figure 1.6 presents the RD plot for the attributes of candidates based on affidavits declared be-
fore the state elections. The figure shows that candidates running for office from SC constituencies
18
have a lower level of total assets in comparison to candidates from non-SC constituencies. Can-
didates from SC constituencies are less likely to be criminals, and they have fewer numbers of
serious criminal charges against them. There does not seem to be a significant difference in the
level of education between the candidates from these constituencies. The plot for the number of
candidates shows there are fewer political candidates seeking office from SC constituencies.26
Table 1.5 presents the RD estimates. The assets are in millions of rupees (1 million rupees =
15,000 US dollars). It is clear that SC reservation causes candidates with lower total assets to
stand for elections; assets are 76 percent lower, representing a magnitude of 9.7 million rupees
(0.14 million USD).27 Candidates from reserved constituencies are less likely to have a criminal
record (4.4 percentage points), 0.16 lower number of criminal cases and 0.13 lower number of se-
rious criminal charges (33 percent and 43 percent lower compared to the mean of the control). The
estimates imply that there is no difference in the level of education among political candidates from
reserved or unreserved constituencies, whereas, the levels of literacy and education are lower for
the scheduled caste population. On average there also seems to be two fewer candidates contesting
from SC constituencies, but the number of females contesting from the reserved constituencies is
higher by 5 percentage points. 28
Hence, restricting only people from Scheduled Castes to stand for elections from the SC con-
stituencies led to candidates with lower criminal charges, lower assets, and increased the represen-
tation of females. One of the aim of affirmative action policies has been to increase diversity in the
sector of implementation (Epple et al., 2008). This seems to have been achieved to some extent
here. Not only do we have an increase in representation of people from the scheduled castes and
tribes, but also women. I also perform the analysis for candidates in national elections, in which
case Parliamentary constituencies are reserved. I follow similar strategy of using the algorithm
for reserving Parliamentary constituencies, and use an instrumental variables strategy to identify
the effect. The analysis, provided in section A.1.1 of the appendix, shows the same relationship
26I present the analysis for SC reservation only. The results for ST reservation remains similar but due to a smaller
number of ST constituencies, the estimation is imprecise (results available upon request). Also, here the comparison
is between constituencies reserved and not reserved for Scheduled Castes (but can be reserved for Scheduled Tribes).
27The coefficient obtained on estimating the regression for logarithm of the total assets is -.57 which translates to
.76 on using expbeta−1. There were around 850 cases in the entire sample with total assets reported as zero. The
coefficients change slightly if I substitute for zero total assets with a value of one, or a number between zero and one,
before taking the logarithm. The estimates in Table 1.5 exclude candidates with very high assets; candidates in the top
.1 percentile.
28For Table 1.5, I consider the bandwidth of equal length on the left and right of cutoff. However there are far
more observations from unreserved constituencies than reserved. The estimates do not change if I consider unequal
bandwidths (for example smaller bandwidth for to the left of the cutoff).
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between reservation and attributes of candidates.
To investigate any heterogeneity in the results, I analyse the different subsamples of candidates
based on their party affiliation, whether they were winners, and their incumbency status.
Party Affiliation: Candidates can seek election in India either independently or through affilia-
tion with a political party. To account for any difference between independent and party-affiliated
candidates, I estimate the regression for the samples separately. Candidates may choose inde-
pendent status if they were not selected by a party, or if they chose not to join a party because
they did not find a party that aligns with their interests. Candidates with party affiliation from SC
constituencies have lower asset holdings (13.17 million rupees/0.2 million U.S. dollars lower, on
average); they are less likely (by 6 percentage points) to have a criminal record than party affil-
iated candidates from non-SC constituencies. The estimates remain negative for the sample that
includes only independent candidates; estimates are lower by approximately 50 percent and in-
significant for the asset and criminality variables, although imprecisely estimated. The estimates
however are negative and significant for the number of males and number of candidates. Thus, the
difference is more pronounced for candidates that are selected by parties. The difference is also
significantly higher for candidates selected by major parties.29
The data suggests some correlation between party candidates and having criminal charges or
higher level of assets.30 The fact that candidates with party affiliation have higher assets has also
been observed in the past for major parties in India (Duraisamy and Jérôme, 2017; Vaishnav, 2012;
Bhavnani, 2012). Additionally, criminality and assets of a candidate have also been found to be
highly correlated (Vaishnav, 2012; Dutta, 2015). Candidates with high assets are strongly pre-
ferred by parties because such candidates can provide additional funding to parties for elections or
for any emergency (Dutta, 2015; Besley, 2005; Mukhopadhyay, 2014). Although voters do seem
to penalize candidates with criminal records (Banerjee et al., 2011, 2014), parties may select can-
didates with a criminal past to intimidate the voters from opposing parties (Aidt et al., 2011).
Incumbents and Winners: Incumbents could have a different probability of winning or value
to the party, such as they can be expected to have some incumbency advantage.31 Additionally,
29Results for independent candidates and major parties are available upon request.
30Results available upon request.
31There has been mixed evidence regarding incumbency advantages in India. Some papers have found that in-
cumbency provided an advantage before 1991 but a disadvantage later (Linden, 2004; Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016;
Uppal, 2009). However, recent research shows that after mandating declaration of the affidavits in 2002, also led to
incumbency advantage because worse candidates chose not to run for office (Fisman et al., 2017). Thus, the long
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assets of a politician could grow as he is in office (Bhavnani, 2012) and thus incumbents from
constituencies can be expected to have higher assets. Thus, I also perform the analysis for only the
non-incumbents who would not have an incumbency advantage. The table shows that the results
hold for non incumbents as well.
Winners by definition can be considered to be the strongest candidate in both the reserved and
unreserved constituencies. To explore whether the difference is observed for even the strongest
candidates from both constituencies, I perform the analysis for winners only. With respect to win-
ners, who are also the elected official or the MLA, the effect is much larger. Winners generally have
higher assets than other candidates on average, which holds true even if we exclude incumbents.
On average, winners have four times the assets of losers, the difference being higher for general
candidates than Scheduled Castes candidates. The regression for difference in attributes only for
the losers would lead to lower estimates. For example, for asset holdings, the estimate for winners
is approximately 5.5 times of that of the losers.32 There is a correlation between the amount of
assets and the status of winning for a candidate. But, the questions whether a candidate’s assets
are a predictor, and the broad questions surrounding the factors that may determine winnability are
issues for future research.
One of the reasons for obtaining the above results could be that people from the reserved groups
are more honest or have lower wealth in general, and therefore candidates from these groups have
the same attributes too. But, that does not seem to be the case. This is also intuitive as it is unlikely
that politicians are a random draw from the population. Unfortunately lack of data prevents veri-
fying this hypothesis by determining the level of criminal charges or asset holdings for the entire
population. I instead provide some other statistics to infer the characteristics of the population. For
example, 3.7 percent of Scheduled Castes older than 15 years have an educational qualification of
“graduate and above”; the comparable figure for people belonging to non-reserved categories is
10.6 percent.33 But, there is no difference in the level of education of the political candidates.
Similarly, the rate of rural poverty is 31.5 percent for the Scheduled Castes population and 22.7
percent for those in non-reserved categories. Thus, the rate of rural poverty is 38 percent higher
established incumbency disadvantage of politicians in India may be reversing now as winners of last election may not
want to contest again if they have low chance of winning and were involved in corruption as they have to declare their
assets if they decide to re contest.
32Results available upon request.
33Source: NSS report on Employment and Unemployment, 2011-2012. The numbers are reported using the clas-
sification of SC, ST, Other Backward Castes (OBCs), and “others” in these reports. The percentage of graduates and
above: from the SC (3.7 percent), ST (3.1 percent), OBCs (6.2 percent) and others (15 percent). People from the
“others” category have the highest educational qualifications.
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for members of the Scheduled Castes populations. The magnitude of the difference between ur-
ban poverty is similar. This suggests that the magnitude of difference we observe among political
candidates from reserved and unreserved constituencies is not driven solely by the difference in
characteristics of the population.34
The results suggest strategic selection by parties in Stage 2 of the conceptual framework, since
the estimate is significantly larger for party-affiliated candidates than for independents. One major
difference between general and reserved constituencies is that in the reserved constituencies all the
candidates belong to the Scheduled Caste; hence, the competition is not on the basis of Scheduled
Caste status, and there is no possibility of choosing someone from the other unreserved castes.
However, in the general constituencies, there might be a preference of politicians from the same
caste or higher caste. So, parties speculate whether they can win on the basis of the caste of the
candidate even if the candidate is a criminal. Also, a party is more likely to nominate criminal
candidates if they have an electoral advantage in constituencies where the party faces strong com-
petition (Dutta, 2015; Mukhopadhyay, 2014). Strategic nomination might also encourage a party to
nominate criminal candidates if other opposing parties are doing so; party leaders may believe that
they need someone equally “powerful”; or because criminality could be effectively neutralized as
a dimension for voters to make their choices if candidates of opposing parties had criminal records.
Finally, following the overall pool of candidates have different attributes, the estimates for win-
ners in Stage 3 show a similar result. Selection of and winning by criminal candidates in India has
received significant attention. Nevertheless, how or why candidates with serious criminal charges
win elections has remained an interesting question. There can be different scenarios under which
criminal candidates manage to win elections. First, voters may not be aware of criminal charges
against a politician; if informed they would not prefer such candidates (Banerjee et al., 2011, 2014;
Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Second, the voter may be aware of criminal charges but does not con-
sider them to be true, or voters perceive it as normal for political candidates to have such charges,
and the charges are of no consequence to them. Alternatively, criminal charges may signal that
the candidate is someone powerful, and thus capable of protecting the citizens of the constituency
from other criminals (and politicians) (Vaishnav, 2012). Furthermore, voters may not be able to
judge a candidate on the basis of criminality if other strong candidates also have criminal charges.
In open or unreserved constituencies voters may choose candidates with criminal backgrounds if
they prefer other characteristics of the candidate, such as the candidate’s caste. Using data from the
34Although, in a general constituency, people from all castes can seek election, candidates from the higher castes
dominate (Pande, 2003; Nath, 2015).
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voter perception survey, I find that people from the unreserved castes cared more about the caste
or religion of the candidate; in all, 20 percent of the respondents from the general caste considered
the caste or religion of the candidate to be very important; this compares to 9 percent of respon-
dents from the reserved castes. Such caste-based voting can lead to the election of people of lower
quality (Banerjee and Pande, 2007). It is possible that, because people in reserved constituencies
effectively cannot vote based on caste, they may be interested in finding out other attributes, or
they may care more about the other attributes of a person as they cannot vote based on caste. By
contrast, in unreserved constituencies, the median voter may have more preference of selecting
someone from high caste and not make the effort to be informed about other attributes of a person.
1.5.2 Effect of Reservation on Provision of Public goods
Figure 1.7 presents the RD plots for the presence of schooling, health, and transportation facili-
ties, and for electricity availability based on data from the 2011 census.35 The plots show that there
is no significant difference in the level of facilities between SC and non-SC constituencies that are
close to the cutoff. The RD estimates for the variables are provided in Table 1.6.36 The top row
represents estimates without state fixed effects, whereas the bottom row represents estimates on
including state fixed effects. The estimates are small, and they decrease with the inclusion of state
fixed effects. The estimates become negative for all the three variables, but remain insignificant.
The standard errors have been clustered at the district level, and the null result obtained is precise.
The largest effect can be observed for the variable “Middle School or higher” with state fixed ef-
fects. The estimates imply that on being reserved for SC, percentage of villages that have a middle
school or higher decreases by 2.3 percentage points. Considering the standard errors, any effect
larger than a decrease of 4.2 percentage points can be ruled out. The average number of villages in
a SC constituency is 150, and thus we can expect three to four villages to be affected. This would
amount to a maximum of 5,000 people to be affected.37
35I have restricted my analysis to districts with at least one SC constituency.
36The bandwidth considered has been implemented using Calonico et al. (2014), and considers the bandwidth of
equal length on the left and right of cutoff. This leads to more observations (approximately double) on the left than the
right as there is a higher number of general constituencies compared to the reserved. The regressions can be specified
to have a smaller bandwidth on the left such that the observations are approximately equal. This can lead to a change
in the sign of the coefficient, but the results would remain within the confidence interval of the initial estimation.
However, this procedure would increase the standard errors.
37Considering that 70 percent of India’s population is rural, this amounts to 0.83 billion people in 600,000 (0.6
million) villages. Therefore, one can estimate that, on average, 1,383 people reside in a village. This implies a
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The RD analyses for credit, recreation, drinking water, and communication facilities are pre-
sented in Figure 1.8. Although there is no significant difference in the facilities, the graph shows a
decrease in the availability of credit facilities as one moves towards constituencies with higher per-
centage of Scheduled Castes population. Table 1.7 provides the estimates for the above variables;
the largest effect is observed for the variable “Credit facilities”. The null result obtained is precise,
and any effect greater than 4.6 percentage points can be ruled out. The results obtained for ST
reserved constituencies using the sharp regression discontinuity design also lead to insignificant
results. The results are provided in figures A.4 and A.5 in the appendix. However, the smaller
number of scheduled tribe-reserved constituencies results in larger standard errors.
Number of Village Facilities: Next, I examine if any change occurred in the intensive margin
of the village facilities; whether the number of such facilties in the villages changed. The census
provides information on the number of village facilities for all the items under each category, such
as number of middle schools, number of secondary schools, and so on. But, aggregating these
variables to have a total number for the entire category is difficult because of possibilities of dou-
ble counting. I perform the analysis for the disaggregate variables; the results do not change with
regard to the discontinuity.38
Growth in the Village Facilities: Finally, I test whether any change occurred in the growth of
the facilities. I use the panel data of village facilities for 2001 and 2011. Figure A.6 of appendix
provides results. The figure shows that while there has been an increase in facilities in the 2001-
2011 period, the reserved constituencies have not gained differentially compared to the unreserved.
As mentioned in section 1.4.2, the level of public goods in 2001 for the new constituencies is an
approximation because some villages in new constituencies were under different constituencies,
and experienced different administration in 2001. In an ideal scenario the analysis would be to
compare constituencies that were hundred percent similar, in terms of composition of villages and
reservation status. However, for constituencies that did not face a huge change in their composi-
tion of villages (that is, they did not experience a major change in their boundaries) or a change
in reservation status, this should be a reasonable method of approximation. To understand size of
the change in the boundaries before and after the delimitation, I overlay the maps of the old and
new constituencies.39 Despite significant boundary changes for many constituencies, the median
maximum of 5,000 people living in three to four villages.
38Results available upon request. I have also performed the analysis for different methods of aggregation and the
results remain the same.
39Details of the analysis and explanation of the overlap percentage can be found in section A.1.2 of appendix.
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overlap percentage between the old and new constituencies is 60 percent.
The regression discontinuity results indicate that the level of village facilities in a reserved con-
stituency is similar to the level in a comparable unreserved constituency in 2011. It is important
to note that the result is for the overall effect of a quota or reservation status. The main channel
through which quotas can affect provision of public goods is through the politician or leader. But,
there can be other channels, too, through which quota might affect development. For example, the
central government might want to direct more resources towards the reserved population, in which
case they could direct resources to constituencies labeled as reserved. Usually the effects of quotas
have been used interchangeably with the effects of the leader; however, it is difficult to rule out
offsetting heterogeneous effects or complementaries between these channels.
There can be several possibilities for the null result. First, based on the leader channel, and in
line with previous speculation, it is possible that the influence of the party is higher, and that the
MLA is taking actions based on party decisions. Moreover, the intentions of a leader from the
reserved or unreserved constituencies may not be very different; both leaders might cater to people
from the reserved communities and provide the basic facilities to gain their votes. But, in the alter-
native scenario - that is, in absence of reservation - there is a higher chance of having a politician
from the unreserved groups, even in the current reserved constituencies. Thus, most likely there
will be lower representation of leaders from the reserved groups. Also, if we speculate that leaders
from reserved groups are puppets in the hands of the party, it is difficult to know if leaders from
unreserved groups in a similar constituency would avoid being puppets in the hands of the party,
or rule without fear of losing due to a weak opposition. Second, this is the situation as of 2011,
and convergence in these constituencies with respect to the facilities in villages has been observed.
Such convergence can be a result of several targeted programs by the Central Government of India
(involving building schools and health centres), because areas with higher percentage of minority
have also been poor and backward.
1.5.3 Robustness Checks
A possible caveat in the analysis for public goods is that the new reservation status was effective
in state elections after the redistricting in 2007. Some states held elections only a year prior to the
2011 census, and, thus, the new reservation status had been in effect for a shorter time. To address
this, I rerun the analysis by restricting the sample to states that had elections at least two years be-
fore the 2011 census. The results are presented in Table A.1 in appendix. There is no change in the
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nature of results obtained. Some areas have been in a reserved constituency for a longer time than
others. However, the boundary changes of constituencies make it difficult to perfectly control for
the duration of reservation status of constituencies. Nevertheless, these changes should not affect
the nature of the results to a great extent. Moreover, Jensenius (2015) obtains similar insignificant
results on development in observing the effect of the reservation status over a longer time horizon
of three decades, during which no change in boundaries or reservation status took place.
To address the fact that aggregation of village-level facilities might average out effects faced
by individual villages, I examine the change in facilities for individual villages that were affected
by the latest redistricting. For this, I use the change in boundaries due to the redistricting as an
exogenous shock. This led to villages changing constituencies and, in some cases, also reserva-
tion status. The analysis for the same is provided in section A.1.3 in the appendix. I find similar
insignificant results. Additionally, earlier papers in the literature have analyzed the effect of reser-
vation of constituencies at the district level, that is, how having an assembly constituency reserved
affects districts. Section A.1.4 in the appendix provides discussion of carrying out a similar analy-
sis in the recent setting.
1.6 Conclusion
Around a hundred of countries across the world use political quotas to guarantee representation
for the minorities in politics. This study examines the effect of quotas on the attributes of politi-
cal candidates, and on the provision of public goods. Using latest data from India and regression
discontinuity, I find that candidates from reserved constituencies (bound by quotas) differ in char-
acteristics from the unreserved regions (not bound by quotas). In particular, the system of political
quotas has given rise to a selection of candidates who have lower financial assets, and who are less
likely to have criminal records. Education levels of candidates are similar, regardless of whether
quotas are in place. Quotas designed to ensure the representation of scheduled castes and tribes
have increased the representation of women, even though this was not the stated intent. There is
also no significant difference in the level of public goods currently available in rural India between
constituencies that are reserved and not reserved.
It is worth mentioning that there might be other unmeasured or psychological gains of having
political leaders from reserved categories of castes and tribes. Such candidates may act as a role
model, and they make people from the reserved groups more comfortable in approaching politi-
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cal authorities, who could also perhaps understand their problems better. The fraction of political
candidates and winners from the reserved groups and women is significantly low in the unreserved
constituencies. This may imply it is unlikely for people from the minorities to gain representation
in absence of quotas.
Quotas in the form of mandated political representation continue to exist in India, and there
have been several demands for extending them to people from other categories. Understanding
the current relevance and different impacts of quotas that were implemented several decades ago
(since 1951) would help in creating and revising effective policies. Additionally, understanding
the defining attributes of a “good” politician remains an open question. Precise knowledge of
the desired attributes could help in determining appropriate eligibility requirements for political
candidates. Policies to increase voter awareness regarding the characteristics of candidates could
lead to candidates with undesirable characteristics losing their electoral advantage. Furthermore,
knowledge of the complementariness between different attributes and performance of a politician
might help to better understand the different channels of influence of various institutional policies.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: First stage estimates for SC
Reservation
(1)





Control % of SC Population
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The number of observations is the number of
constituencies within the optimal CCT band-
width (5.1). The standard errors are clustered
at the district level. The estimates remain sim-
ilar for different selection of bandwidths.
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Table 1.2: Attributes of Candidates by Reservation
Status of Constituencies
GEN SC ST
Total Assets 21.57 6.68 7.51
Movable Assets 7.10 1.54 2.20
Immovable Assets 14.47 5.14 5.32
Liabilities 3.39 0.72 0.74
Net Wealth 18.18 5.96 6.77
No. of Criminal cases 0.50 0.26 0.25
No. of Serious Crimes 0.30 0.16 0.18
Has a Criminal Record 0.19 0.13 0.12
Males 0.94 0.90 0.90
Age 44.68 44.57 44.89
No. of Candidates 13.44 11.43 8.37
College and Above 0.40 0.40 0.38
N 29,183 4,785 2,018
Information for candidates contesting state elections post
2008. The asset holdings are provided in million of Indian
rupees (1 million rupees = 15,000 US dollars) and illustrates
the average amount of assets held by a candidate from a con-
stituency type.
Table 1.3: Voters Opinion in India by Caste of the Respondent
GEN SC ST
Panel A: Importance of characteristics of candidates
Candidate 0.369 0.444 0.413
Party 0.245 0.249 0.298
Caste/Religion 0.206 0.091 0.109
PM candidate 0.222 0.185 0.188
Gifts distribution 0.098 0.052 0.063
Panel B: Importance of facilities to the voters
Electricity 0.426 0.453 0.470
Health 0.446 0.486 0.502
Agriculture 0.401 0.419 0.436
Education 0.431 0.475 0.495
Transport 0.460 0.474 0.488
Job Reservation 0.394 0.416 0.429
Employment 0.474 0.474 0.485
Defence/Safety 0.394 0.395 0.403
N 81,818 41,325 18,985
The table summarizes the responses of individuals in the Daksh Voter Percep-
tion survey by the caste of the respondent. Panel A represents the percentage
of respondents who think the mentioned characteristic of the candidate to be
very important, whereas Panel B represents the percentage of respondents
who considered the indicated facility to be very important. The survey was
based on a large sample and the preferences are statistically different across
people from different caste.
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Table 1.4: Level of Village Facilities by Reservation
Status (2011)
Variables GEN SC ST
Middle School or higher 0.576 0.554 0.499
Hospitals/Health Centres 0.362 0.328 0.314
Transport 0.626 0.575 0.473
Electricity 0.851 0.838 0.656
Credit facilities 0.313 0.270 0.152
Tap 0.643 0.595 0.495
Recreation facilities 0.518 0.536 0.471
Phone/Post Office 0.919 0.915 0.846
N 2048 490 263
The table presents the percentage of villages in the con-
stituency having several public goods or facilities for the entire
sample of 2,801 constituencies by reservation status. In some
cases the difference between the means are significant, but we
can see that the gap even if significant is not large.
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Table 1.5: Quota affects Attributes of Candidates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES All candidates Party candidates Winners Non incumbents Mean
Total Assets -9.726*** -13.175*** -39.471*** -8.071*** 16.05
(1.846) (1.995) (10.064) (1.823) (0.44)
Immovable Assets -7.182*** -9.145*** -29.076*** -6.060*** 11.64
(1.582) (1.357) (6.436) (1.607) (0.33)
Has a Criminal Record -0.044*** -0.060*** -0.138*** -0.042*** 0.19
(0.012) (0.015) (0.048) (0.012) (.003)
No. of Criminal cases -0.159*** -0.208*** -0.885** -0.141*** 0.48
(0.048) (0.066) (0.371) (0.044) (.01)
No. of Serious Crimes -0.129** -0.164** -0.678** -0.114** 0.29
(0.050) (0.067) (0.275) (0.047) (.01)
No. of Candidates -2.086*** -2.103*** -1.469*** -2.109*** 13.48
(0.654) (0.559) (0.466) (0.666) (.04)
Males -0.056*** -0.063*** -0.084** -0.059*** 0.94
(0.009) (0.011) (0.037) (0.009) (.002)
College and Above -0.006 -0.031 -0.058 -0.001 0.4
(0.016) (0.021) (0.055) (0.017) (.004)
Observations 20,280 13,118 1,768 19,363 15,752
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column 5 is the mean of the control group for all candidates. All the specifications include the percentage of Scheduled
Castes population in the constituency and states as control. The estimates obtained are based on Calonico et al. (2014) which
implements robust bias corrected local polynomial RD point estimators and an equal bandwidth of 6 for both sides has been
considered. Candidates with total assets above the 999th quantile have been dropped to confirm the results are not being
driven by candidates with exceptionally high assets. The results hold on excluding candidates in the top 1 percentile as well,
but the estimates decrease slightly. The optimal CCT bandwidth was approximately equal to six for all variables. The number
of observations indicate the sample within a bandwidth of six and for linear polynomial. The estimates remain similar for
different polynomial specifications and selection of bandwidths.
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Table 1.6: No difference in Village Facilities between SC and non-
SC Constituencies








Reserved for SC -0.0123 0.0163 0.0083 0.032
(0.0287) (0.0272) (0.0379) (0.0348)
Observations 1490 1530 1673 1887
Reserved for SC -0.0234 0.00087 -0.0139 -0.0133
(0.0190) (0.0172) (0.0147) (0.0191)
Observations 1345 1373 1456 1525
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The estimates obtained are based on Calonico et al. (2014) which implements robust bias corrected
local polynomial RD point estimators. Estimates with and without controlling for states are included
in the bottom and top panel respectively. The estimates remain similar for different polynomial spec-
ifications and selection of bandwidths. The number of observations indicate the sample within the
optimal CCT bandwidth.
Table 1.7: No difference in Village Facilities between SC and non-
SC Constituencies







Reserved for SC -0.0140 -0.0007 0.0326 0.0071
(0.0298) (0.0305) (0.0448) (0.018)
Observations 1540 1866 1948 1840
Reserved for SC -0.0269 0.0069 -0.0147 0.0018
(0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0178) (0.0127)
Observations 1285 1514 1522 1560
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The estimates obtained are based on Calonico et al. (2014) which implements
robust bias corrected local polynomial RD point estimators. Estimates with and
without controlling for states are included in the bottom and top panel respec-
tively. The estimates remain similar for different polynomial specifications and
selection of bandwidths. The number of observations indicate the number of
constituencies within the optimal CCT bandwidth.
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1: Assembly constituencies of India
The figure represents the map of India. The dotted areas represent the unreserved or general constituencies whereas the striped ones represent the
reserved constituencies.
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Predicted no. of SC constituencies in a District
The figure plots the number of SC constituencies allocated to districts vis-a-vis the predicted number of SC constituencies that a district was
supposed to receive. The figure shows that the rule followed by the Delimitation Commission for the allocation resembles a step function.
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Normalised rank of the Constituency
The figure plots the relationship between the reservation status of the constituency and the normalised rank of the constituency based on the
percentage of Scheduled Castes population. The no. of SC seats in a district serve as the rank cutoff which has been normalised to 0.
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Deviation of %SC from Cutoff
The figure plots the relation between the reservation status of a constituency for Scheduled Castes and its percentage population of Scheduled
Castes. The percentage population of Scheduled Castes corresponding to the number of constituencies to be reserved acts as the cutoff for this
figure. The running variable has been normalised to have the cutoff of percentage population of Scheduled Castes as 0 and thus all other points are
differences of the percentage population from the cutoff. The figure shows the probability of being reserved increases by 95 percentage points on
crossing the threshold.
36




























-100 -50 0 50 100
Deviation of %ST from Cutoff
The figure plots the relation between the reservation status of a constituency for Scheduled Tribes and its percentage population of Scheduled
Tribes. The percentage population of Scheduled Tribes corresponding to the rank cutoff acts as the cutoff for this figure. The running variable has
been normalised to have the cutoff of percentage population of Scheduled Tribes as zero and thus all other points are differences of the percentage
population from the cutoff. The figure shows the probability of being reserved is one on the right of the threshold.
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Diff in %SC from the cutoff
The figure plots the asset holding and criminal records of candidates based on self declared affidavits. The figure shows that the candidates
contesting elections from SC constituencies have lower assets and lower criminal charges against them. There is not a significant difference in the
proportion of college graduates among the political leaders on average.
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Diff in %SC from the cutoff
SC reservation on Power availability
The insignificant results remain similar on different polynomial specifications or choice of bandwidth.
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Diff in %SC from the cutoff
SC reservation on Communication facilities
The insignificant results remain similar on different polynomial specifications or choice of bandwidth.
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Chapter 2
DOES MORE SCHOOLING INFRASTRUCTURE
AFFECT LITERACY?
2.1 Introduction
Lack of schooling infrastructure has been recognized as a common problem in developing coun-
tries. Therefore, the government of these countries along with international organizations (such as
the World Bank) have taken several steps to expand it. The objectives behind expansion of school-
ing infrastructure are to: increase accessibility of schools, promote universal primary education, or
increase the literacy rate. There exists some evidence showing that investment in schooling infras-
tructure leads to an increase in years of education (Duflo, 2001), enrollment (Barrera-Osorio et al.,
2011), and educational achievement (Case and Deaton, 1999).1 But, increasing access through
building schools can be expensive, which also requires simultaneous scaling of other infrastruc-
ture and learning resources to be effective (Muralidharan and Prakash, 2017). This becomes even
more of a concern for large government programs, since other complementary resources may not
be available. In this paper, I study if expansion in schooling infrastructure can influence the literacy
rate, especially the literacy rate of females.
Being literate can be considered as the basic step for attaining education, and in a country with
poor levels of literacy, ensuring universal literacy can be considered a priority. 750 million youth
and adults in the world cannot read or write, whereas 250 million children do not have the ba-
sic literacy skills (Unesco, 2016), with 52% of the illiterate youth and adults belonging to South
and West Asia (Unesco, 2016). This is also accompanied by women having even lower levels
of literacy with a gender gap in literacy of 7.3% for the world (Unesco, 2016). It has also been
established that a low level of literacy is associated with negative consequences, such as unemploy-
ment, poverty, and early rate of pregnancy among females (Bown, 1990; Burchfield et al., 2002;
1For example: An increase in educational input or pupil-teacher ratio led to an increase in enrollment and test
scores (Case and Deaton, 1999). There was an average increase of 0.12 to 0.19 years of education for each pri-
mary school constructed per 1,000 children after school construction program in Indonesia (Duflo, 2001). Similarly,
expansion of publicly funded private schools in Pakistan led to an increase in enrollment of 51 percentage points
(Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011).
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Robinson-Pant, 2006).
To study this question, I use a nationwide education program launched by the Government of
India, which aimed to make primary education universally accessible and to improve the educa-
tion status of girls. The ongoing program Education for All movement or Sarva Sikshya Abhiyan
(SSA) entails building schools, providing necessary goods and facilities (for example: textbooks,
uniforms, drinking water, and separate toilets for girls), hiring more teachers, and providing train-
ing for the teachers.2 Additionally, the program incorporates facilities in schools and curriculum
to accommodate students with disabilities and students from diverse groups of population. 3
With a gender gap of 21.59 percentage points (Census, 2001) between male and female literacy
rate in mind, the program had a special focus on girls. Focussing on improving education oppor-
tunities for girls through construction of schools (Andrabi et al., 2013; Kazianga et al., 2013) or
scholarship programs (Filmer and Schady, 2008; Kremer et al., 2009) are not uncommon in de-
veloping countries. Under the SSA program there were specific schemes for girls in subdistricts
or blocks called the educationally backward blocks (EBBs); EBBs were blocks with a low female
literacy rate and a high gender gap in literacy rate.4 Classification as an EBB entitled the blocks
to receive additional funding to build special facilities, such as residential schools for girls, and for
conducting campaigns to encourage enrollment of girls. Since, the basis of the classification was
to target and improve the education facilities of areas with low female literacy rate, I study if the
classification as EBB brought a significant increase in the female literacy rate.
However, the challenge in identifying the effect of being classified as an EBB on the growth in
literacy rate is resolving the problem of endogeneity. For example, the blocks that are classified
as educationally backward are also economically backward and have a low literacy rate originally.
Thus, to find a causal estimate, we need blocks that are otherwise similar to the EBBs, but were
not classified as an EBB. To solve the endogeneity issue, I use the Regression Discontinuity (RD)
2Understanding the effectiveness of providing a particular input has also been an important question in the litera-
ture. There have been several studies which have studied the effectiveness of providing a specific input such as school
feeding program in Philippines (Jacoby, 2002), flipcharts (Glewwe et al., 2004), teachers (Banerjee et al., 2007; Du-
flo et al., 2012), textbooks (Glewwe et al., 2009), grants (Das et al., 2013), and cycles to schools (Muralidharan and
Prakash, 2017).
3Prior to SSA, there have been other programs to enhance education in India whose effectiveness have also been
studied in the literature like the DPEP (Jalan and Glinksya, 2013; Azam and Saing, 2017; Khanna, 2015). Mid-day
meal program (Afridi, 2010, 2011; Singh et al., 2014), Operation blackboard (Chin, 2005). After 2001, SSA became
the comprehensive program for many schemes before it targeting at all the different needs required for schooling.
4Blocks also known as Tehsils, Mandals, or subdistricts are the subdivisions of a district in India. Gender gap in
literacy rates is defined as the difference between the male and female literacy rate.
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method by exploiting the criteria used to classify a block as an EBB. The exercise would compare
similar blocks that were barely eligible and ineligible for classification as an EBB. I use this to
estimate the impact of being an EBB on the literacy rates after a decade of implementation of the
program.
An important step is to investigate if the planned proposal for building schools was implemented
and if there was a difference in the intensity of the program for the educationally backward blocks.
To confirm whether or not there was an actual expansion in the number of schools as promised by
the program, I use the school census of all schools in India. To the best of my knowledge, this is
the first paper using a seven year panel dataset of around a million school in India. I find that clas-
sification of a block as an EBB led to an increase in the number of schools built in the last decade;
EBBs had approximately 14 more schools (43% higher) and 0.93 more girls’ schools compared to
NEBBs around the cutoff. Moreover, the data shows that residential schools for girls were built
only in the EBBs as specified by the program. There were improvements in various facilities, such
as availability of computers, classrooms, and electricity. There has been construction of new fa-
cilities along with a repair of the previous facilties. Using data on disbursement of funds, I also
find that the states with a higher proportion of EBBs received a higher funding from the program.
These evidences suggest that there was a significant expansion in the schooling infrastructure and
the EBBs did receive a higher allocation of resources under the program.
But, the EBBs did not show a significant change in the female literacy rate after a decade of
being classified as educationally backward and receiving an expansion in schooling infrastructre.
The estimate obtained is statistically zero and any effect greater than 1.2 percentage points for a
sub-district can be ruled out. I find a similar insignificant result for the decrease in the gender gap
in rural literacy with a confidence band of 0.7 percentage points.
The channel through which we can expect an expansion in schooling infrastructure to affect
literacy is that by making education more accessible to children, having them enrolled in school
would help them learn to read and write, which would increase the literacy level of the current
and the future generation. But, it has also been observed that enrollment in a school may not be
enough for a student to achieve any level of learning like being able to read or do math.5 Thus, for
the increase in schooling infrastructure to convert to an increase in literacy rate or educational out-
5For example, the 2011 ASER report for rural India states that 38.4% of students in grade one could not recognize
a letter and 36.5% of students could not recognize numbers (ASER, 2011). Banerjee et al. (2010) in their experiment
in Jaunpur district found similar evidence. Muralidharan (2017) suggests that improving school inputs in the ”business
as usual” manner will have little effect on learning outcomes, recommending changes in pedagogy and governance.
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come, it would need to be accompanied by an increase in enrollment, quality teachers, and effective
learning methods. A similar concern exists for other efforts which involve building infrastructure
to solve a social problem, such as the Total Sanitation Campaign in India for elimination of open
defecation. The campaign involved construction of toilets throught out the nation, but that did not
guarantee proper functioning toilets or their use by the citizens.
It is possible that it may take more time for such an infrastructure investment to cause a change
in the literacy rate, although the literacy rate in 2011 would be after a decade of the implementation
of the program. Also, given the situation in India, it may take time for areas with low literacy rates
to catch up, and poor transportation facilities can additionally hinder accessibility to schools. Thus,
an expansion in schooling infrastructure may not lead to a quick solution if the aim is to increase
literacy rate. There might be other cost effective and targeted methods for a quicker solution to
low levels of literacy.
Sarva Sikshya Abhiyan is a large program that has received a lot of attention. There have been
several evaluation reports and case studies about the program (PEO, 2010; Paisa, 2012), but rig-
orous causal empirical analysis is limited. The closest paper to this study is Meller and Litschig
(2015), which finds a positive effect of two girl-specific programs in EBB called National Program
for Education of Girls at Elementary Level (NPEGEL) and Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya
(KGBV) on enrollment, and also find a reduction in the gender differences in enrollment. Apart
from these two programs which were supposed to be implemented only in the EBBs, I also find
that EBBs received higher targeting from the SSA program, such as there were more schools built
in the EBBs. Another paper (Jalan and Glinksya, 2013), however, did not find any decrease in
the gender gap in enrollment or educational achievement due to the District Primary Education
Program (DPEP) in India, which was an education program before the SSA. Both papers studied
the effect of education programs on enrollment rates; this paper contributes to the literature by
examining if similar schooling expansion programs have an effect on the literacy rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the program. Section 2.3
outlines the empirical analysis. Section 2.4 provides the results obtained. Section 2.5 presents
additional analyses, and Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
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2.2 The Program
2.2.1 Aims and Objectives
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) is a comprehensive effort by the Government of India to tackle
the various issues related to accessibility of schools in India. This is also an effort to ensure uni-
versal primary education for the nation which has been the aim of the Government of India since
the nation’s independence in 1947. The first formal statement on universal primary education was
the National Policy on Education (1968), and regular attempts have been made to ensure universal
primary education since then. As of the year 2015, 1.4 million children aged 6 to 11 were out of
school in India (Benavot and UNESCO, 2015), and the dropout rate for students in grades 1 to 8
was 42.4% in 2009-10 (UNESCO, 2015). A concern for out of school children is the risk of getting
involved in child labor, which is also a serious problem in many developing countries.6 Addition-
ally, the Government of India has taken several steps to increase the literacy and educational status
of the population. The literacy rate in India has grown to 74.04% (2011 Census), but the nation
still has the largest number of illiterate population in the world. Therefore, SSA was implemented
in the last decade to address the various problems related to education in India.
A major hurdle in making education accessible is the absence of schools in rural areas or schools
with poor infrastructure. Thus, one of the main aims of the program has been to build new schools
and improve the infrastructure of existing schools.7 Improvement in infrastructure include building
and repairing classrooms, toilets, and drinking water facilities. In addition to improving the infras-
tructure, the program made primary education free for everyone, removing the cost of schooling as
an obstacle. Finally, to improve the quality of learning and to make the curriculum more relevant,
the curriculum was adapted to address children from diverse background in different locations.
Along with the low accessibility of education to the population, girls face additional challenges
in enrolling or remaining enrolled in school. Some of the reasons for low enrollment or high
dropout rate among girls is they are often required by their families to help with domestic chores,
to take care of siblings or are married off at an early age (Glick, 2008). Other factors such as the
distance to schools, lack of female teachers, the absence of girls’ toilets, and safety concerns also
6The number of children aged between 5 to 14 involved in child labor in India is reported as 10.13 million out of
259.64 million children in the same age group (Cry.org and Census 2011)
7This also formed a major component of the expenditure of funds. The exact proportion directed for infrastructure
or civil works varied across years and states but remained closer to 50%. For example, in the year 2006-07, 71% of
the total allocation of SSA fund was towards civil works and the final expenditure was 56%. Source: State-wise and
Component wise allocation and expenditure reports, SSA
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contribute to lower enrollment of girls (Lloyd et al., 2005; Burde and Linden, 2013).
Thus, to encourage education for girls, the program allocates extra funds at the district level for
awareness campaigns to drive enrollment, to build toilet for girls, and to train teachers to be sensi-
tive to girls’ needs. Additionally, specific schemes like the National Program for Education of Girls
at Elementary Level (NPEGEL) and Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya (KGBV) were introduced
which included building residential schools for girls. These schemes are an integral component
of SSA but have a separate status and receive additional funding.8 Therefore, this program can
be seen as a universal drive encompassing schooling infrastructure, but catering to gender specific
needs at the same time.
To identify areas that are falling behind substantially, especially in female literacy, the Depart-
ment of Education and Literacy classified blocks as educationally backward (EBB) or not edu-
cationally backward (NEBB). The classification was based on the twin criteria of rural female
literacy rate being below the national average of 46.13% and the gender gap in total literacy being
above the national average of 21.59%. As an exception, some blocks or urban slums with a high
proportion of minorities, namely the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), were
classified as an EBB even if they did not satisfy the twin criteria.9 The educationally backward
blocks were classified to receive the girl specific schemes of NPEGEL and KGBV. Classification
of blocks into EBB and NEBB forms the basis of my identification strategy.
2.2.2 Funding and Implementation of the Program
The program has a bottom-up approach in planning which makes the program more effective
and relevant to the society. There are planning teams at different levels of administration, includ-
ing at the district, block, and habitation level. The program collects and incorporates feedback
from the local community about the problems and requirements related to schooling in the area.
The program also provides responsibilities to the Village Education Committees (VECs) to moni-
tor the schools, hire teachers, request resources from the district level administration and provide
feedback to the higher level authorities.10
8KGBV was launched as a separate scheme in 2004 but has been merged into SSA from Apr, 2007. The SSA
must also carry out planning for implementation of these schemes.
9Specifically, blocks belonging to districts with female literacy rates of the SC or ST population below 10% and
comprising at least 5% of the population; Source: MHRD planning and appraisal
10However, there was some evidence that few parents knew of the existence and the responsibilities of VECs in the
Jaunpur district of Uttar Pradesh in 2005 (Banerjee et al., 2010)
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The administration of the program is decentralized with project offices being set up at local lev-
els to help with the implementation of the program. For successful implementation, it is necessary
to monitor if the tasks under the program were being carried out successfully. Hence, officials from
resource centers at lower levels of administration, such as at the block and cluster levels, were to
visit the schools and the sites of construction for schools. In addition, several other institutions
have been involved in monitoring the different steps of the program. For example, in 2013-2015,
38 universities across different locations were appointed as monitoring institutions. The respon-
sibility to monitor the teachers and the school administration rests with the School Management
Committees under the Program and the Right to Education Act (2009). The committees consist
of members representing different groups in the society, such as people from NGOs, education
department, and parents. To discuss the progress of the program, and sort out any issues that the
states could be facing, joint review missions are held twice a year from 2005 onwards.11
SSA is an ongoing program with funds being allocated by the central and state governments
every year. The financing of SSA was borne by the tax base of the country with an additional levy
of an educational tax. Initially, the program was to be funded entirely by the government of India,
but later from 2004 onwards due to an insufficiency of funds, additional funding was provided by
international aid agencies like the World Bank and European Commission. The share of funds to
be released by the central and state governments was proposed to be 85:15 in 2001-02, 75:25 for
the years 2002-07 and to change gradually to 50:50. The total release of funds in the decade for the
year 2001-2010 has been Rs.1,25,323 crore or 27.3 billion dollars.12 The funds from the center are
disbursed to the state implementation society which is then transferred to project offices in districts.
However, there have been some criticisms of the program regarding the allocation and utiliza-
tion of funds. For example, there was a lack of transparency about the procedure followed for
disbursement of funds and there was an underutilization of funds allocated under the program. In
spite of the fact, that funds may not have been fully utilized or were utilized with a delay, there was
a significant expansion of infrastructure, which should serve as a good proxy for the expenditure
11The information about the program in this section has been obtained from program documents available on
http://ssa.nic.in, (UNESCO, 2015; PEO, 2010), and documents on SSA framework from Ministry of Human Resource
Development (MHRD, 2009). The program website has now moved to http://shagunssa.nic.in
12The initial release of funds for the scheme was Rs.584 crore (123.75 million dollars) in the year 2001-02 which
increased more than ten times to 6,846 crore (1,510.6 billion dollars) by 2004-05 and to 30,793 crore (6.73 billion
dollars) by 2010-11. The Centre:State ratio differed for some states. Audited expenditure has been Rs.120,820 crores
(2.63 billion dollars). The fund under SSA was used in providing teachers salary, textbooks, civil works, management
grants and other expenses
47
of funds, or as a proxy for work done by the program. Moreover, states with a higher percentage
of EBBs seem to have received a higher allocation of funds under SSA as seen in Figure 2.1. Fig-
ure 2.1 plots the allocation of SSA funds (in million dollars) to states vis-a-vis the percentage of
EBBs. The figure shows that the funding allocated and spent under SSA had a positive relation
with the proportion of EBBs in a state, which suggests that the program prioritized areas with
higher EBBs.13 More details regarding fund utilization can be found in the appendix.
2.3 Empirical Methods and Analysis
2.3.1 Data and Summary Statistics
This study uses information from several datasets. The classification of blocks as an EBB/NEBB
is obtained from the Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD). The classification was
based on the female rural literacy rate and the gender gap in total literacy rate for the year 2001.
For examining the growth in the literacy rate after a decade of this program, I take the population
census of India for 2001 and 2011 to obtain the literacy rate for the respective years.14 The number
of blocks in 2001 was 5,463, which is taken as the base sample in the paper. Table 2.1 summarizes
the information for the demographic variables from the Census of 2001 and the literacy rate in
2001 and 2011 from the respective censuses.
Since, the main aim of the program was to expand schooling infrastructure, I use the District In-
formation System for Education (DISE) dataset to investigate whether or not there was an increase
in the number of schools built and an improvement in the level of various schooling facilities. The
DISE dataset is an exhaustive source of information on schools in India. For this analysis, I ex-
clude private unaided schools and schools in urban areas. Although the dataset does contain the
information on the location of schools, there does not exist a common location code to match this
dataset with either the data on literacy rate for blocks from the census or the data on classification
of a block from the MHRD. Hence, I had to merge the datasets using names of blocks, which can
be different or can be spelled differently across datasets. Even after several rounds of matching, it
was not possible to match the datasets perfectly and the final sample was reduced to 3,991 blocks
13The plot uses the data for the year of 2008, the relation remains similar for other years. The value of funds has
been converted to US dollars based on the exchange rate for the respective year.
14While conducting the census, the head of the household or respondent is asked for the number of literate person
in the household. In case of a doubt, the interviewer is asked to make the individuals read. The literacy rate in India is
calculated by taking the percentage of literates above age 6 in the population.
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from 5,463 blocks which is used for analyses in the paper.15
Using the data, I find that the average number of schools built in a block has increased over
the years as shown in Figure B.1 of the appendix; the increase being higher in EBBs compared
to NEBBs. Furthermore, such a significant difference between number of schools built in EBBs
vs NEBBs is not observed for the previous decade of 1990-2000 as shown in Figure B.2. The
average number of schools built annually in the rural areas of a block is around 4 to 6 schools,
with some blocks having higher or lower number in certain years. The third plot shows there has
been zero construction of KGBV schools in the NEBBs, which according to the program were to
be built only in EBBs.16 The results remain the same when the outcome considered is the number
of schools per thousand children. To examine if there was an improvement in schooling infrastruc-
ture, I compare the level of schooling facilities such as classrooms, electrification, and computers
for the academic years of 2005 and 2011 in Table 2.2. The table provides the average level of
facility in a school in a block. As observed from the table, the level of inputs received by a school
has increased over time. For example, the percentage of schools that are electrified has doubled,
although approximately 50% of schools did not have electricity in 2011.
Additionally, we could expect the schooling condition to vary based on whether a school was
old or new. For example, building the first classroom will be a priority for a new school, but an old
school may focus on repairing the existing ones. Therefore, I plot the variation in the condition
of schooling infrastructure by the year of establishment of the school in Figure 2.2. The different
plots tell us that the availability and condition of schooling infrastructure vary across schools estab-
lished in different years. We can see that as expected the proportion of good classrooms are higher
in the new schools, but the new schools still need to make investments in providing electricity or
computers. Thus, probably with the progress of years and increase in student capacity, the new
schools will increase the number of facilities as the older schools which have been functioning for
a longer period of time.
2.3.2 Identification Strategy: Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity
The challenge in estimating the effect of being classified as educationally backward on any out-
come of interest is the problem of omitted variables. This is because the classification of EBBs was
15More details on the matching procedure is available in the data appendix.
16The DISE dataset has the year a school was built, and I have used the DISE dataset for 2013 to find all schools
that were established until 2010. The KGBV schools are recognized based on the residential status of the school.
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not random and these were blocks with a low female literacy rate. Using a simple OLS regression
would lead to the following specification:
Outcomei = α +βEBBi + εi (2.1)
where EBB is a binary variable, which equals 1 if the block is an EBB and 0 otherwise. The
outcome variables of interest in this paper are the literacy rate indicators and the level of schooling
infrastructure of a block. However, due to the problem of omitted variables, we cannot use the
method of OLS estimation as that would lead to biased coefficients.
Therefore, to tackle the endogeneity problem, I use the method of Regression Discontinuity
(RD) as an empirical strategy. This is possible because the classification of EBBs was based on
a criteria; rural female literacy rate below the national average of 46.13% and the gender gap in
total literacy rate above the national average of 21.59% in 2001. Regression discontinuity assumes
that blocks on both sides of the cutoff are otherwise similar except to exposure of the program; I
provide evidences for the validity of the assumptions in the next subsection. This helps me to find
an unbiased estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE) by comparing observations only
around the cutoff.17
The criteria for classification used two variables; rural female literacy rate and gender gap in
total literacy rate based on Census 2001. This would imply two running or assignment variables.
In the standard scenario, while obtaining RD estimates using local linear regressions, observations
within an optimal bandwidth based on a single forcing variable is considered. Therefore, I restrict
the sample to 2,626 blocks which satisfy the criteria of having the gender gap in total literacy rate
(GGLR) above the national average of 21.59%; maintaining the rural female literacy rate (RFLR)
for year 2001 as the single assignment variable.18
The relation between the proportion of blocks that were classified as an EBB and the RFLR
is represented in Figure 2.3. As seen from the first panel of the figure, there does not exist a
clear discontinuous relation between the probability of a block being classified as an EBB and the
RFLR when all the observations are considered. But, after considering only blocks which satisfy
17To the best of my knowledge, the criteria used for classification of blocks as educationally backward is not used
for any other classification or for implementing any other programs.
18The alternative of restricting the sample to ones which satisfy the RFRL threshold and using gender gap in total
literacy rate as the assignment variable leads to a smaller sample. However, the results are not different as seen in
Figure B.3 of the appendix.
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the gender gap criteria, we observe a clear discontinuity as shown in the second panel. However,
the probability of classification as an EBB does not change from 1 to 0 on crossing the cutoff of
RFLR, and there are some blocks classified as an EBB even when the RFRL is above the cutoff or
vice versa.
This results in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design instead of a sharp regression discontinuity.
The fuzzy design occurs due to few exceptional cases, such as classification of blocks belonging
to districts with at least 5% of SC or ST population and female literacy rate of the SC or ST group
below 10% as an EBB, even if they did not satisfy the general criteria (MHRD, 2009). The sec-
ond panel of Figure 2.3 shows the probability of a block being classified as an EBB increased by
approximately 70 percentage points at the cutoff, i.e on having a RFLR less than the national av-
erage of 46.13%. The regression specification for a fuzzy regression discontinuity can be defined
as follows:
Yi = α +βDi + f (Xi)+ εi (2.2)
Di = α1 +β1Zi +g(Xi)+µi (2.3)
where Yi is the rural female literacy rate or the gender gap in rural literacy rate for 2011, Xi is
the rural female literacy rate for 2001, Di=1 if a block is an EBB, and Zi=1 if the RFLR for a block
in 2001 was below the cutoff. The endogenous variable EBB is instrumented with the dummy
variable Zi, i.e the discontinuity we obtain in the first stage is used as an instrument for obtaining
the causal effect of classification as an EBB.
However, estimating the above equations parametrically would rely on the choice of a functional
form. An alternative method is to find estimates based on local linear regression that provides a
nonparametric method of estimating the causal effect at the cutoff using local linear regression.19
The coefficient of interest β can then be estimated as below:
β =
limx↑c E[Y |X = x]− limx↓c E[Y |X = x]
limx↑c E[D|X = x]− limx↓c E[D|X = x]
(2.4)
by considering only observations close to the cutoff, which provides estimates that are unbiased
19Detailed discussion and review in Lee and Lemieux (2010).
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but have lower precision. To balance the tradeoff between bias and precision of the estimates,
observations within an optimal bandwidth are considered for the estimation. I report the bias cor-
rected robust estimates using the optimal bandwidth procedure based on Calonico et al. (2014)
(CCT) which measures the average treatment effect at the threshold. Additionally, I present the
estimates based on Nichols (2016), which uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal
bandwidth.
The first stage estimates are presented in Table 2.3, which shows that the probability of being
classified as an EBB increased by approximately 75 percentage points on crossing the cutoff for
the RFLR. The estimates remain consistent with different regression specifications and for differ-
ent values of bandwidth.20
2.3.3 Regression Discontinuity Validation
The RD analysis is valid under certain assumptions: there must be no manipulation of the treat-
ment variables around the cutoff, there is no discontinouos difference in the covariates across the
cutoff, and the assignment variable is continuous. I check for the satisfaction of each of these
assumptions.
Firstly, I do not find any evidence of manipulation of the treatment variable. I validate this as-
sumption using the McCrary test from McCrary (2008), and the null hypothesis of no manipulation
is accepted. From Figure B.4 we do not see any evidence of bunching of observations around the
cutoff. Additionally, the RFLR and the GGLR are calculated using the census data by finding the
percentage of literate population in the block. Manipulating an aggregate variable which is a ratio
is not straightforward as one has to be able to manipulate the number of literate population, or the
total population, or both. After the population census of India is conducted, the data is released by
the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, which is an independent organisation,
and tampering with this data is highly unlikely. Furthermore, the data on population from the cen-
sus is also used for several other purposes. Thus, it is difficult to manipulate the aggregate literacy
indicator of a block by anyone which could result in a misclassification.
20The states and Union territories of Delhi, Chandigarh, Goa, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Sikkim, Lakshad-
weep, Puducherry, Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli had no blocks classified as educationally backward. I
also perform the analysis by excluding states which did not have any block classified as EBB and the results remain
similar.
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Secondly, as shown in Figure B.5, covariates such as the total population of a block, the percent-
age of males in the population, and the population of children in the age group 0 to 6 are found
to be continuous across the cutoff of RFLR for 2001. Given the rural female literacy rate and the
gender gap in total literacy rates are continuous variables, the final assumption of the assignment
variable being continuous is satisfied.
2.4 Results
Effect on Number of Schools
Figure 2.4 shows the relation between the number of KGBV or residential school for girls, total
number of schools, schools for girls only, and coeducational schools built in the decade of 2000-
2010 in a block with respect to the rural female literacy rate of the block. The figure has been
constructed for observations with above average gender gap in literacy rate. First, we observe
that the number of KGBV schools is zero on the right of the cutoff, which shows that the KG-
BVs were built only in the EBBs as directed under the program. The second plot also shows that
the total number of girls’ schools differed discontinuously at the cutoff. However, the number of
schools exclusively for girls is much lower in general as most of the schools in the given context
are coeducational schools. Such a discontinuous relation was not observed in the decade before the
implementation of SSA, i.e for the years 1990-2000 as shown in Figure B.6 of appendix.21 Second,
we do observe that the total number of schools established in the last decade differed according
to the eligibility status of an EBB and the trend is similar when only coeducational schools are
considered.
The RD estimates obtained are reported in Table 2.4. The table shows that being classified as an
EBB led to 14.45 more schools in the last decade, the coefficient is positive although insignificant
with high standard errors. To underst and the relative magnitude and reduce the variance, I also
obtain estimates for the logarithm of the total number of schools. The estimate obtained is 0.659
which is significant at the 5% level. Usually, there are few schools that are exclusively for girls.
The coefficient for number of girls’ schools and KGBV schools are positive and significant at the
1% level. Although, the coefficient implies a 200% increase compared to the mean of the control
group but approximately one more school was built for girls only. It is also to be noted that EBBs
on the farther left of the cutoff experienced a higher expansion in the number of schools than the
EBBs closer to the cutoff. This could be due to prioritizing EBBs that have relatively lower rural
21According to the data, there were 15 KGBVs that were built in the last decade which is also observed in the plot.
53
female literacy rate, which can be a justified effort on the part of the implementer. Therefore, we
observe a significant expansion of schools in the last decade, especially for the EBBs because of
SSA.
Effect on Literacy Rate
But, such an expansion in the number of schools did not cause a significant change in the rural
female literacy rate of the blocks. Figure 2.5 presents the RD plots for the outcome variables:
increase in the rural female literacy rate and decrease in the gender gap in rural literacy rate for the
last decade (2001-2011). The figure shows that there is no significant discontinuity in the outcome
variables at the cutoff. Although the program did not have a significant improvement for observa-
tions around the cutoff, blocks on the left had a greater increase in the rural female literacy rate,
and the effect was higher for blocks farther away from the cutoff.22
The point estimates for the literacy outcomes are presented in Table 2.5, which are positive but
not statistically significant. The confidence interval for the estimates are relatively small imply-
ing precise estimation of the zero result. As also evident from the figure, any effect greater than
approximately 1.2 percentage point increase in the rural female literacy rate over a decade can
be ruled out, which would comparatively be a small effect. Similarly, any effect greater than 0.7
percentage point decrease in the gender gap in rural literacy rate can be ruled out which once again




To complement the RD analysis and as a robustness check, I also perform a difference-in-
differences analysis. Using a difference-in-differences methodology for the entire sample requires
validation of the parallel trend assumption, which unfortunately is not possible because of data
limitations. However, keeping this limitation in mind, I use difference-in-differences analysis to
find the average effect for all the blocks that were classified as educationally backward. The rele-
vant equation is the following:
22The results remain similar for total literacy rate or the total female literacy rate as well.
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Yi = α +βEBBi +δPosti +λEBBi ∗Posti + εi (2.5)
The year of 2001 is considered as the pre treatment period and the year 2011 is taken as the post
period.
Table 2.6 provides the DID estimates for the outcome variables: the rural female literacy rate
(RFLR) and the gender gap in rural literacy rate (GGRLR). The estimates imply that the educa-
tionally backward blocks experienced a 5.6 percentage points increase in RFLR in the post period
as shown in column (1) on average, whereas the GGRLR declined by 0.98 percentage points, as
shown by estimates in column (3). Thus, comparing all the EBBs and NEBBs, we observe there
was an increase in the rural female literacy rate for the EBBs in the last decade. This could be
driven by blocks farther away from the cutoff which received higher intensity of the program (had
greater number of schools built as shown in Figure 2.4) and also had a higher percentage point
increase in the rural female literacy rate. But, this included comparing blocks that were not similar
in other characteristics as well. To validate the regression discontinuity results, I consider only ob-
servations close to the cutoff. I obtain similar insignificant result as shown in column (2) of Table
2.7. The estimate for an increase in RFLR is positive and the maximum effect would be around
1.2 percentage points which is similar to the maximum effect predicted using RD. Similarly, the
estimate obtained for the GGRLR in column (4) is insignificant, but the coefficient is negative im-
plying a decrease in the GGRLR.
2.5.2 Spillovers across Blocks
The analysis so far was to understand the effect of the program on the blocks or sub-districts, but
to account for any spillover across sub-districts, I also find the effect of the program at the district
level. To do this, I perform a district level analysis using the percentage of educationally backward
blocks in the district. Districts are the next higher level of administration compared to blocks. The
districts vary in the composition of blocks that are educationally backward, which can serve as a
measure for the intensity of the program received by a district. The districts are divided into quan-
tiles based on the percentage of EBBs. As shown in Figure B.7, there was a greater increase in the
rural female literacy rate and a larger decrease in the gender gap in rural literacy rate for districts
in the higher quantiles, i.e with higher percentage of EBBs.23
23I also use this measure of intensity of program for districts in chapter 3, where I explore whether the literacy
rate and educational backwardness of districts are spatially correlated. I do find spatial correlation in the errors from a
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I compare the result for districts obtained above with the growth in the literacy rate for the pre-
vious decade, and find that the growth was lower for districts with a higher proportion of EBBs in
the previous decade. To illustrate, I plot the decrease in the gender gap in the literacy rate for 1991-
2001 (before the launch of SSA) and for the period of 2001-2011 in Figure B.8. The figure shows
that the decrease in the gender gap in literacy rate was lower for districts with a high proportion of
EBBs in 1991-2001, implying these districts were in a worse situation compared to other districts.
But, the trend is reversed in the 2001-2011 decade. There is an upward trend in the decrease in the
gender gap in literacy rates, i.e districts in the upper quantiles with a higher proportion of educa-
tionally backward blocks experienced a larger decrease in the gender gap in literacy rates. Thus,
educationally backward districts had a higher growth in the literacy rate during the implementation
of SSA in the previous decade.24
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper explored the effect of expansion in schooling infrastructure and targeted education
policies on the literacy rate of a nation, especially the female literacy rate. To do this, I used an
education policy in India, which invested in improving schooling infrastructure with a special fo-
cus on facilitating education for girls. This study finds the program led to a huge expansion in
the number of schools, an improvement in infrastructure, and facilities like residential schools for
girls. Furthermore, the expansion was discontinuously higher for blocks which were educationally
backward, and such an expansion was not observed in the earlier decade. But, this did not lead to
a significant impact on the literacy rate after a decade of implementation of the program.
A possible concern in this analysis is that literacy rate is calculated using all population above
age 6 in India, but the policy only affects (or is more likely to affect) children from age 6 to 18
(in school age). Hence, an analysis using cohorts of children during the period under study would
have been more useful, which unfortunately is not possible due to unavailability of data for pop-
ulation belonging to different age groups in a block. However, there would be several cohorts of
children from primary to secondary schools who would have benefited from the policy in the last
decade. Moreover since the adult literacy rate (literacy rate of population above age 15) has also
been increasing over time, if there was an increase in the literacy rate of children, it must have been
non-spatial model, which may lead to inconsistent but unbiased estimates.
24I was able to include all the blocks in the districts according to the respective census for the analysis in Figure
B.8, since the district level analysis did not have the problem of incomplete matching of blocks across several datasets.
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captured as an increase in the overall literacy rate.
Nevertheless, investment in schooling infrastructure along with teaching and learning methods
should form a strong foundation for improving education and literacy in the long run for future
generations. When implemented in the form of large scale programs, which has been common in
India and other countries as well, special efforts need to be made regarding scaling other resources
and ensuring precise implementation of the program. Alternatively, there have been other local
based efforts to increase adult literacy, such as Sahajani Shiksha Kendra by a national NGO Niran-
tar, litreacy classes by Mission India, a missionary organisation. Comparing the effectiveness of
such local based programs might be an interesting area for future research.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for the sample
EBB NEBB
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev.
%Scheduled Caste 16.27 8.25 17.84 10.81
%Males 51.196 1.28 51.01 1.42
%0 to 6 child 17.84 3.08 14.34 2.48
%Scheduled tribe 15.02 23.78 11.21 20.934
Rural Female Literacy Rate’01 33.43 8.04 57.94 9.23
Rural Female Literacy Rate’11 48.34 7.37 67.16 8.827
Gender Gap in Total Literacy Rate’01 28.1 5.7 20.24 6.73
Gender Gap in Total Literacy Rate’11 22 4.8 15.2 5.76
No. of blocks 1,770 2,221
EBB: Educationally Backward Block, NEBB: Not Educationally Backward Block. The
above table summarizes some of the key demographic variables from Census 2001.
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Table 2.2: Growth in School Inputs
Year 2005 Year 2011
No of visits by officials from CRC 5.38 5.90
(0.06) (0.07)
No of visits by officials from BRC 2.00 2.46
(0.03) (0.03)
Amount of SSA fund Received (Rupees) 4018.69 13523.37
(85.00) (204.13)
Amount of SSA fund spent (Rupees) 3518.15 12134.43
(72.69) (101.84)
No of classrooms in a school 3.34 3.86
(0.02) (0.02)
%Schools having electricity 25.11 51.22
(0.44) (0.60)
No of computers in a school 0.35 1.09
(0.02) (0.03)
No. of blocks 3935 3973
The table summarizes some of the variables for schooling infrastructure
using the DISE data for the two academic years of 2005 and 2011. The
variables represent the average input for a school in a block. CRC: Cluster
Resource Center, BRC: Block Resource Center.
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Table 2.3: First Stage Estimates: Probability of being classified as
EBB
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Rural Female Literacy Rate -0.754*** -0.727***
(0.0759) (0.0838)
Rural Female Literacy Rate -0.761***
(0.0555)
Observations 327 327 776
Control N Y N
Bandwidths IK IK CCT
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (2) provides the estimates obtained on controlling for demo-
graphic variables and state fixed effects. The controls used are percentage
of Scheduled caste and Scheduled tribe population, percentage of males,
and percentage of children in the age group 0 to 6 in rural area based on
Census 2001 data. I report estimates using both the optimal bandwidth cri-
teria of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014) which
are 2.6 and 6.1 respectively. The IK estimates were obtained using the code
of Nichols (2016) and the CCT estimates were obtained using the code of
Calonico et al. (2014). The estimates obtained remain similar for different
values of bandwidth or polynomial specification.
Table 2.4: Effect of being classified as EBB on number of schools built
VARIABLES Schools Girls’ schools KGBV schools Coed Schools
EBB 14.45 0.932*** 0.239*** 13.53
(9.324) (0.299) (0.0730) (9.172)
Mean of Control 32.580 0.463 0.018 32.192
(1.800) (0.075) (0.007) (1.787)
Observations 843 681 958 846
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The number of observations are within the optimal Calonico et al. (2014) bandwidth.
Standard errors have been clustered at the district level.
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Table 2.5: Effect of being classified as EBB on literacy
rates
(1) (2) (3)





Mean of Control 10.742
(.25)






Mean of Control 6.35
(.124)
Observations 618 618 891
Bandwidth IK IK CCT
Control N Y N
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The top panel represents estimates in percentage points for in-
crease in rural female literacy rate (IRFLR) of a block from
2001 to 2011. The estimates for the second outcome variable
of interest, decrease in gender gap in rural literacy rate (DG-
GRLR) which is defined as Male rural literacy rate-Female ru-
ral literacy is provided in the bottom panel. DGGRLR is con-
structed by subtracting the gender gap in rural literacy rate of
2011 from gender gap in rural literacy rate of 2001. The column
specifications are similar to the specifications in Table 3.
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Table 2.6: DID estimates for Literacy rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES RFLR RFLR GGRLR GGRLR
EBB*Post 5.660*** 0.920 -0.983** -0.277
(1.224) (0.589) (0.417) (0.300)
R-squared 0.832 0.848 0.764 0.870
No. of blocks 3,845 742 3,845 742
Block Fixed effect Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
RFLR: Rural Female Literacy rate, GGRLR: Gender gap in Rural Lit-
eracy rate. Column (1) and column (3) provide DID estimates for the
whole sample, whereas, the estimates in columns (2) and (4) are ob-
tained for the sample of blocks close to the cutoff. The estimate is sig-
nificant for the entire sample, but not for the sample close to the cutoff.
However, the coefficients are positive and negative implying an increase
in the Rural Female Literacy rate and decrease in the Gender gap in Ru-
ral Literacy rate respectively. The regressions include block fixed effects
and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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2.8 Figures
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% of Educationally Backward Block
The figure shows a positive relation between the quantity of SSA fund allocated to a state and the percentage of Educationally Backward Blocks in
the state
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Year of establishment
The figure shows that the proportion of good classrooms are higher in the newer schools but probably will need more time to catch up with the old
schools in the number of computers or electricity. This could also be because the old schools have been functioning for longer period of time and
have higher enrollment and capacity.
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Female Rural Literacy Rate '01
Observations with above average Gender Gap
The figure shows that the probability of being classified as EBB increased by 70 percentage points at the cutoff. The plot on the top is for the entire
sample whereas the plot on the bottom is obtained by resticting observations that satisfy the criteria of having the gender gap in total literacy rate
above the national average.
65


















10 20 30 40 46 50 60 70

















10 20 30 40 46 50 60 70












10 20 30 40 46 50 60 70















10 20 30 40 46 50 60 70
Female Rural Literacy Rate '01
The number of schools established in the last decade (2001-2011) differed discontinuously according to the eligibility status of EBB and the
number of KGBV schools established drops to 0 on crossing the cutoff.
66

























40 45 50 55


































40 45 50 55
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The figure plots the increase in rural female literacy rates and the decrease in gender gap in rural literacy rates over the decade for the optimal
bandwidth calculated based on Calonico et al. (2014). The graphs show that there was no significant discontinuity at the cutoff.
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Chapter 3
SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF AN EDUCATION
PROGRAM AND LITERACY IN INDIA
3.1 Introduction
A common method used for the implementation of public programs to address access to basic
necessities, such as education and health, is to target geographic areas in need of the public pro-
gram. It is often of interest to measure the effect of such programs. Given the spatial contiguity of
geographic areas, there is possibility of spatial correlation between areas that receive the program
and in the outcome variables used to measure the results of the program. In standard program eval-
uation, the possibility of spatial dependency among geographic neighbors is usually not taken into
account. Using a non-spatial model when a spatial model is appropriate would violate the classical
assumptions required for obtaining biased and inconsistent estimates. In this paper, I investigate
the presence of spatial correlation, and use estimates from a spatial and a non-spatial model to
explore the association between expansion of schooling infrastructure and literacy in India.
I study the education program Sarva Sikshya Abhiyan (SSA) or the Education for all move-
ment, which was launched in India in 2001. The program was a nation-wide initiative for building
schools and providing other necessities to students, such as textbooks, uniforms, drinking water,
and hiring new teachers. Given the low literacy level of females in India (according to Census
2001, the average female rural literacy rate in 2001 was 46.13% and the average gender gap in
literacy rate was 21.59%), the program was implemented with a focus on girls. The SSA incor-
porated specific schemes for girls, such as building residential schools and enrollment campaigns
to encourage admission of girls in schools. The program focused on districts with a high gender
gap in literacy rates and a low rural female literacy rate, that is, districts that were relatively edu-
cationally backward. A more educationally backward district received higher funding from SSA,
and also received additional funding for specific schemes, such as building residential schools for
girls and funds for enrollment campaigns.1 Hence, I study if there was an increase in the rural
1The program focused on educationally backward blocks and I am using the percentage of educationally backward
blocks in a district as the measure of the intensity of the program as explained in the paper. The percentage of EBBs or
intensity ranges from zero to hundred. I am also referring to districts with higher percentage of educationally backward
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female literacy rate and a decrease in the gender gap in literacy rates in districts that were more
educationally backward.
Spatial correlation is said to exist if the variable in one district is dependent on the variable of
a nearby district. Such dependency may exist because of geographic, demographic, administra-
tive, or any reason which can be related to distance. I examine whether or not there is spatial
auto-correlation in the educational backwardness of districts, which determine the intensity of the
program received, and if the outcome variables of interest (rural female literacy rate) are spa-
tially dependent. This is in contrast to the scenario when a variable or feature may be distributed
randomly in space. Spatial correlation unlike temporal correlation is not unidirectional and thus
defining the direction of the spatial correlation and which units are considered as “nearby” units
(units that are spatially correlated) is not obvious. To do this, I perform exploratory spatial data
analysis and also find the optimal spatial weight matrix to define “neighbors”, that is, the districts
who are spatially dependent. I use geo-spatial data on districts of India for spatial analysis and
modeling.
I find a positive spatial correlation between districts that are educationally backward, as indi-
cated by the Moran’s I statistic for global spatial correlation. Additionally, using local indicator of
spatial autocorrelation (LISA), I find spatial clusters, which identify regions of spatial concentra-
tion of districts that are educationally backward, in the north-east and the center of southern India.
These regions have generally experienced lower rate of development in India. There is spatial
correlation in the dependent variable, the change in rural female literacy rate as well. The spatial
maps also suggest evidence of a positive relation between districts that experienced a greater in-
crease in the rural female literacy rate and districts that were educationally backward or received
the program with higher intensity.
The data suggests spatial auto-correlation in the errors, therefore, estimating a non-spatial model
would lead to statistically inconsistent estimates of the association between the percentage of edu-
cationally backward blocks and literacy rate. On estimating an OLS model to predict the influence
of educational backwardness of a district on the literacy rate, I find the errors are not normal,
are heteroscedastic, and are spatially correlated. To account for the spatial dependency, I use the
Lagrange multiplier test (Anselin, 1988) to choose between the two major categories of spatial
models, the spatial lag and the spatial error model, and I find the spatial error model as the appro-
priate model category. The spatial error model incorporates spatial correlation in the errors. I also
use the likelihood ratio test to determine the spatial model which best explains the data.
blocks as a district that is relatively more educationally backward.
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The resulting optimal model is the spatially distributed error model (SDEM), followed closely
by the spatial error model, and I provide estimates from both the SDEM and the spatial error model.
The SDEM includes spatial dependency among neighbors in the errors as well as the independent
variable, which is the educational backwardness of a district or a measure of the intensity of the
program received (treatment). Thus, I can also investigate whether or not there is an additional
influence on the literacy rate of a district apart from the treatment it receives just because its neigh-
bors receive a different intensity of treatment.
The SDEM estimates imply a 0.076 percentage point increase in the rural female literacy rate
with a one point increase in the the educational backwardness of a district, and a 0.02 percentage
point decrease in the gender gap in rural literacy rate with a one point increase in the educational
backwardness of a district. The SDEM estimates were similar to the estimates from the spatial
error model. The difference between the SDEM and OLS estimates are very small for the outcome
increase in rural female literacy rate (0.076 compared to 0.073) and for the outcome decrease in
rural gender gap in literacy rates (0.02 compared to 0.0175). The coefficient capturing spatial
dependency in the educational backwardness of a district, that is the association between the treat-
ment received by the neighboring districts and the outcome of a district is 0.011 and is insignificant.
Thus, I did not find evidence of the treatment received by the neighboring districts influencing the
literacy rate of a district, and the source of spatial correlation was in the errors (as also suggested
by the error model).
Spatial dependency and interactions among neighbors has been an important question in the
literature and is observed in various contexts, such as in education, government expenditure, en-
vironmental policy, politics, and demography. In the context of schooling, there is evidence on:
spending by schools in a district to depend on school spending of neighboring districts (Ajilore,
2011; Ghosh, 2010), positive correlation in adopting open enrollment policy between neighbor-
ing school districts (Brasington et al., 2016), teacher salaries to be highly influenced by salaries
in similar districts (Greenbaum, 2002), geographical contiguity to foster local competition which
increases efficiency for public and private schools (Millimet and Collier, 2008; Misra et al., 2012;
Gonzalez Canche, 2014; McMillen et al., 2007).
Strategic interaction has also been observed for property-tax competition among local govern-
ments (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001), expenditure of state governments (Case et al., 1993),
spending decisions of local governments in Portugal (Costa et al., 2015), recreational and cul-
tural services provided in municipalities in Sweden (Lundberg, 2006), in incumbent behavior of
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politicians (Besley and Case, 1992).2 Similar questions of dependency has been studied for strin-
gency of environmental policies (Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002b), pollution abatement expendi-
ture (Fredriksson and Millimet, 2002a), and sex ratio of a district (Echávarri and Ezcurra, 2010).
3.2 Context and Data
3.2.1 Program and Measure of Treatment
The Sarva Sikshya Abhiyan or the Education for All program was launched in 2001 to increase
access to education in India. This was an effort in the direction to achieve universal elementary
education, which has been a goal of the government since India’s independence in 1947. The
program aimed to improve the schooling infrastructure in the country. Improvement in infrastruc-
ture and schooling facilities included building and repairing classrooms, building girls’ toilets, and
drinking water facilities. The program also hired new teachers and trained them, and also designed
the curriculum to include the interests of children from diverse backgrounds. In addition to pro-
viding the necessary infrastructure, the program aimed to increase enrollment and reduce drop out
rates of children.
The financing of SSA was borne by the tax base of the country with the implementation of an
educational tax. The total allocation of funds in 2001-2010 was Rs.1,25,323 crore or 27.345 billion
dollars and the audited expenditure was Rs.120,820 crores (2.63 billion dollars). The fund from the
central government was transferred to the state, which was then transferred to the districts.3 The
program followed a bottom-up approach in planning and sought more community involvement
with planning teams at the district, block and habitation level to accommodate location specific is-
sues and needs. These teams include people from NGOs, teachers, education department, parents
among others.
Given the low enrollment or high dropout rate of girls, the program made special efforts to in-
crease the enrollment of girls in schools in India.4 India has a large number of illiterate people
and a low level of female literacy (average female literacy rate was 46.13% according to Census
2For an overview of strategic interaction among governments refer to (Brueckner, 2003).
3The funding at the central level followed a rule but the exact rule used to allocate the funds to the next adminis-
trative levels remain to be investigated.
4The dropout rate for adolescent girls in India is as high as 63.5% (Information from Cry.org which is based on
MosPI,2012).
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2001). To identify areas that are falling behind substantially in female literacy, the Department of
Education and Literacy of India classified blocks (also known as sub-districts, which are at a lower
administrative level compared to districts) as educationally backward (EBB) or not educationally
backward (NEBB). The classification was based on the twin criteria of rural female literacy rate
being below the national average of 46.13% and the gender gap in total literacy being above the
national average of 21.59%. Classification as an EBB entitled the blocks to receive additional
funding to build special facilities, such as residential schools for girls known as Kastruba Gandhi
Balika Vidyalay (KGBV), and for conducting campaigns to encourage enrollment of girls under
the National Program for Education of Girls at Elementary Level (NPEGEL).
The program was targeted to blocks, and I take advantage of the method of classification of
educationally backward blocks to investigate the effect of expansion in schooling infrastructure on
literacy using the method of regression discontinuity in chapter 2. I find a significant expansion
in the schooling infrastructure in the educationally backward blocks, but I do not find a significant
effect of being classified as EBB on the increase in rural female literacy rate. Using box plots I
do find suggestive evidence of districts with higher percentage of EBBs having an increase in the
rural female literacy rate and a decrease in the gender gap in literacy rate.5
However, in this paper I am interested to explore spatial correlation in dependent and indepen-
dent variables, which may exist due to demographic, geographic, administrative reasons, or any
reason related to distance, and I use the data on the literacy rate and the percentage of educationally
backward in districts from chapter 2 to study this. To understand the spatial correlation, I consider
districts as the relevant spatial unit; districts are a higher administrative level compared to blocks,
and on average there are ten blocks in a district. I define the percentage of educationally backward
blocks in a district as the treatment intensity of the program in that district.
There can be various reasons to expect spatial dependency in educational backwardness and lit-
eracy rates between districts. Firstly, areas that are educationally backward may overlap with areas
that are also economically backward and geographic regions which have not experienced growth
and development. Secondly, districts in the same state may benefit from common state programs
or the allocation of funds and resources of a district may depend on the resources received by
nearby districts. Finally, children in a district may attend schools in neighboring districts which
have better schools or infrastructure, or also be motivated to enroll in school if the children in
nearby districts are enrolling. This is not uncommon in rural India where distance to schools can
be a major deciding factor in choosing the school to attend. There also exists evidence for insti-
5For further details on the analysis, please refer to (Jogani, 2018).
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tutions and schooling districts engaging in strategic spending and competing for students in other
countries (Ajilore, 2011; Ghosh, 2010; Greenbaum, 2002).
3.2.2 Data
I use the spatial maps of the administrative districts of India from Census 2001 shared by
the Datameet community. I obtain information on the classification of blocks as educationally
backward or non-educationally backward from the Ministry of Human Resource Development
(MHRD). The classification was based on the rural female literacy rate and the gender gap in total
literacy rate for the year 2001 based on the population Census. For examining the growth in the
literacy rate after a decade of this program, I use the population census of India for 2001 and 2011.
The total number of districts used for the analysis is 576 out of a total number of districts of 592.6
Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics of the treatment variable (percentage of EBBs) and the
literacy variables for districts in India in 2001. The table shows that the mean percentage of EBBs
in a district is 45.9. Figure 3.1 shows the frequency distribution of EBBs and I find the median
percentage of EBBs in a district to be 42.9.
3.3 Spatial Econometric Methodology
3.3.1 Detecting Spatial Auto-correlation
To investigate the presence of spatial correlation, I perform some exploratory spatial data anal-
yses using quantile maps. For the analysis in this paper, I use the GeoDa software, which has
wide applications in the field of regional science for spatial analysis (Anselin, 2005; Anselin et al.,
2006). There are several analytical methods to understand local and global spatial correlation. One
of the common statistic used to understand global and local spatial correlation is the Moran’s I
statistic. The global Moran’s I statistic inform us about the overall spatial auto-correlation in a
data set. However, due to spatial heterogeneity, the degree of correlation may vary across space,
and thus local statistics help to determine the spatial correlation in different areas across space.
The local Moran’s I statistic provides the degree of association for each spatial unit and its spatial
6The total number of districts in 2001 was 592. However, there was no unique identification code for matching
the data-sets, and thus I was able to match 576 districts accurately. The total number of sub-districts or blocks was
5,463 according to Census 2001.
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neighbors. I use global and local Moran’s I to understand the global and local spatial correla-
tion in the data. A positive auto-correlation implies the spatial adjacent areas have similar values,
whereas a negative auto-correlation implies the spatial adjacent areas have different values. The
Global Moran’s I can be represented by the following equation:
I =
NΣiΣ jWi j(xi− x)(x j− x)
ΣiΣ jWi j(xi− x)2
(3.1)
where N is the total number of observations (districts in this case), i and j represent spatial units (or
districts), X is the variable of interest for detecting spatial correlation (for example the percentage
of educationally backward blocks or change in literacy rate), X is the mean of X , Wi j is the optimal
weight matrix (which is discussed in the next section).
The statistic can be interpreted as a ratio of the covariance between spatial units and the total
observed variance. I ranges from -1 to 1, where -1 implies perfect negative spatial correlation,
1 implies perfect positive spatial correlation, and 0 implies no spatial correlation. To determine
whether or not there is significant spatial correlation is to compare the statistic I obtained from the
above equation with the expected value of I under the null hypothesis of no spatial correlation,
which = −1/(N − 1) (Dall’erba, 2005). If I is greater (lower) than −1/(N − 1), then the data
suggests positive (negative) spatial correlation. In this analysis, N = 576, therefore, −1/(N−1)=-
0.00174
The local Moran’s I statistic for each region i can be obtained using the following equation
(Anselin, 1995):
Ii =
N(xi− x)Σ jWi j(x j− x)
Σi(xi− x)2
(3.2)
where Ii is the local Moran’s statistic for spatial unit i, and j represents the neighboring units, N
is the total number of observations (districts in this case), X is the variable of interest for detect-
ing spatial correlation (for example the percentage of educationally backward blocks or change in
literacy rate), X is the mean of X , Wi j is the optimal weight matrix (which is discussed in the next
section).
To represent local spatial correlation, I use the local indicator of spatial auto-correlation (LISA)
cluster map. The LISA cluster map presents areas with significant and insignificant local Moran’s
I statistic. Thus, the cluster map also helps to identify local spatial clusters or hotspots.
74
3.3.2 Weight Matrix
Spatial correlation implies units i and j are correlated, i.e Cov(Xi,X j 6= 0). However, with N
number of observations, the number of correlations to estimate would be N(N− 1)/2, which can
be a very large number. The number of correlations to be estimated can also be reduced once we
know the neighbors that interact with each other. To do this, I define a spatial weight matrix which
imposes a structure on the nature of correlation between the spatial units. A spatial weight ma-
trix usually relies on the distance between neighbors and is thus exogenous. I describe the spatial
weight matrices I use below:
Distance Based Spatial weights: One of the common method is to use the great circle distance
(or arc distance, which is calculated using the latitudes and longitudes of the spatial units), where
Wi j = 1 if the distance between i and j is below a user defined threshold (Dall’erba, 2005; Anselin,
2005). For example, spatial units i and j are defined as neighbors if the distance between them is
below the threshold of 250 miles. However, the distance has to be above the minimum distance
required for every spatial unit to have at least one neighbor. I find the minimum distance required
for every spatial unit to have at least one neighbor for the data set as 270 miles. I find distance
based spatial weight matrices for the minimum distance (270 miles). I also find distance based
spatial weight matrices for 300 miles and 325 miles to check for robustness, the results remain
similar on using the different distances.
Higher order contiguity: The units i and j are said to be contiguous of the order K if the max-
imum number of borders to cross to reach j from i is K (Anselin, 2005). The contiguous relations
can be of various kinds which lead to different weight matrices, such as matrices Queen, Rook,
and Bishop. For example, in the below table, we can define the following weight matrices based




Rook: The spatial units labeled as Y are considered neighbors.
Queen: The spatial units labeled as X and Y are considered neighbors.
Bishop: The spatial units labeled as X are considered neighbors.
K-Nearest Neighbors: The value of K is chosen a-priori which is used to define the K nearest
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neighbors of j, the definition is based on the distance between the centroids of the spatial units.
Wi j = 1 if the centroid of area i is one of the K nearest neighbor from j, Wi j = 0 otherwise (Anselin,
2005).
I use the above weight matrices to find the weight matrix which captures the nature of spatial
correlation best for the given data set, or has the highest value for the local Moran’s I statistic.
3.3.3 Determining the Spatial Model
I am interested in investigating the presence of spatial dependency and in estimating the relation-
ship between the educational backwardness of a district and the increase in rural female literacy
rate (or the decrease in gender gap in total literacy rates).7 A non-spatial model can be represented
by the following equation:
Yi = α +βTi + γXi + εi (3.3)
where Ti is the percentage of educationally backward blocks (EBBs) in a district, (Xi) are other
demographic characteristics of the districts which are used as controls, and Yi is the outcome of
interest. In the context of this paper the outcomes are the literacy rate variables, increase in rural
female literacy rate (IRFLR) and the decrease in rural gender gap in literacy rates (DGGRLR). The
coefficient of interest is β .
The most common form of spatial models are the spatial lag model and the spatial error model.
In case of the spatial lag model, the outcome in a district depends not only on the independent
variables or the covariates of that district, but also on the outcome of its neighbors, whereas in the
spatial error model, the error term of the district is correlated with that of the neighbors.8 Using
matrix notation, the spatial lag model and the spatial error model can be represented by equations
(3.4) and (3.5) below:
Y = ρWY +Xβ + ε (3.4)
Y = Xβ + ε,ε = λWε +µ (3.5)
where µ v N(0,σ2I).
7For review of spatial models refer to (Anselin, 2002).
8The models in the spatial literature can also be compared with those in the time series literature, such as the
spatial lag model can be compared with the AR(1) model which is represented as Yt =ρYt−1+εt .
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However, in presence of spatial correlation, a non-spatial model may lead to biased and inconsistent
estimates depending on the type of spatial dependency. To illustrate, consider the spatial lag model
as shown by equation (3.4). (3.4) can be rewritten as below:
Y = (I−ρW )−1Xβ +(I−ρW )−1ε (3.6)
=⇒ ∂Y
∂X
= (I−ρW )−1β 6= β
Hence the estimates are biased.
Similarly, in case of a spatial error model, the errors are correlated, violating the assumption for
consistency of OLS estimates.
Thus, we must define spatial models that would capture spatial dependency in the data to obtain
unbiased and consistent estimators.
To choose between the spatial lag and error model, I use the Robust Lagrange Multiplier test
(Anselin, 1988, 2005; Anselin et al., 1996).
Some other common spatial models are the spatial lag of X (SLX) model and the spatial durbin
error model (SDEM) (Vega and Elhorst, 2015). These models are a variant of the spatial lag and
spatial error models and are represented by the following equations:
Y = ρWX +Xβ + ε (3.7)
Y = ρWX +Xβ + ε,ε = λWε +µ (3.8)
Compared to the spatial lag model, which included spatial dependency in Y as shown by equa-
tion (3.4), the SLX model includes spatial dependency in X. In the SLX model, the outcome Y
of a district depends on the covariates of the district and also the covariates of the neighbors. The
SDEM model is a combination of the SLX model and the spatial error model, it includes spatial
dependency in X and spatial dependency in the error term. I will also be using the above models
to compare the results.
77
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Spatial Correlation: Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis
To understand the spatial distribution of the educationally backward areas, I draw a quantile map
which divides the districts of India into four groups based on the concentration of educationally
backward blocks in the district. This is presented in Figure 3.2. Districts with the darkest shade are
ones with 90-100% educationally backward blocks. The quantile map shows districts with high
intensity of treatment were surrounded by districts with high intensity of treatment as well, and
vice versa. Thus, this indicates presence of spatial correlation among neighboring districts in the
proportion of educationally backward areas or the intensity of treatment.
Figure 3.3 presents the quantile map of the outcome variable of interest, increase in rural female
literacy rate (IRFLR), for the period of 2001-2011. The districts with the darkest shade have ex-
perienced a maximum increase in the rural female literacy rate in the last decade. There exists a
similar pattern of spatial correlation between neighboring districts, that is, districts with high IR-
FLR are surrounded by districts with high IRFLR and vice versa. Additionally, comparing Figures
3.2 and 3.3, we observe a correlation between districts with a high percentage of EBBs and districts
with a high IRFLR. But, there are also some districts, for example in the west of India, which have
a high percentage of EBBs, but a low IRFLR.
To define the spatial neighbors, I find the weight matrix that would best capture the spatial auto-
correlation in the data, that is, choose the matrix with the highest Moran’s I. I calculate the Moran’s
I (which is a measure of spatial correlation) for different kind of matrices as described in Section
3.2, that is matrices defined on the distance based spatial weight, on contiguity, and on K-nearest
neighbors. On trying the different spatial weight matrices, I find the average Moran’s I is highest
for the K5 weight matrix for both the independent and dependent variables (EBB and IRFLR).
Thus, I use the K5 matrix as the weight matrix to define the spatial neighbors for the rest of my
analysis.
Figure 3.4 presents the univariate global Moran’s I plot for the treatment variable, percentage of
educationally backward blocks. The figure captures the spatial correlation in the treatment variable
between a district and it’s neighbors (represented by the spatially lagged variable on the vertical
axis). The Moran’s I obtained for the relation is 0.66, which is greater than -0.00174 (the value
for −1/(N−1) as described in section 3.1). Thus, this indicates a significant positive spatial auto-
correlation between the neighbors. Figure 3.5 presents the univariate global Moran’s I scatter plot
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for the outcome variable IRFLR and the Moran’s I statistic obtained is 0.51, which also indicates
a positive spatial correlation in IRFLR between the neighboring districts.
The positive Moran’s I and the linear relation shows that there is a significant correlation among
spatial units and their neighbors with respect to both the outcome (increase in rural female literacy
rate) and the independent variable (percentage of EBBs). Additionally, the null hypothesis of such
correlation to be random, is rejected at a significance level of 1% for both variables. Figures 3.3
and 3.4 suggest the presence of global spatial auto-correlation.
To understand the nature of the local spatial auto-correlation, I present the local indicator of
spatial auto-correlation (LISA) cluster map for the treatment variable in Figure 3.6 and for the
outcome variable in Figure 3.6. The districts with high (low) EBB are labeled as high (low) in
Figure 3.6 and districts with high (low) IRFLR are labeled as high (low) in Figure 3.7. The plots
are constructed using standardized values on the axes, such that each unit corresponds to a standard
deviation. The scatter plot is centered on the mean to divide the plot into four quadrants. The top
right and bottom left correspond to positive spatial autocorrelation, whereas the bottom right and
top left correspond to negative spatial autocorrelation.
The LISA cluster map shows the spatial clusters or hotspots, which identifies regions where there
is higher spatial auto-correlation between districts. The red regions are the high-high regions, that
is, districts with high values of the treatment or outcome variable are also surrounded by districts
with high values of the treatment or outcome variable implying positive local spatial correlation.
The blue regions are the low-low regions, which shows areas with low values of the treatment or
outcome variable are surrounded by districts with low values of the treatment or outcome variable,
also implying positive local spatial correlation. A High-Low region implies negative spatial corre-
lation as High districts are surrounded by Low districts. The other regions do not show a significant
presence of local spatial auto-correlation between the districts at a significance level of less than
5%.
3.4.2 Model Estimation
I begin by estimating the OLS model as shown in equation (3.3), where the independent vari-
able is the percentage of blocks that are educationally backward in a district. I also include other
covariates as controls, such as the percentage of minority population in the district during the
implementation of the project (areas with high minority population have been historically disad-
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vantaged and experience lower literacy rates) and also the percentage of female population. I find
the Moran’s I statistic of the residuals from the OLS model for the outcomes IRFLR and DGGRLR.
The statistic obtained was 0.42 and 0.47 for IRFLR and DGGRLR. The Moran’s I statistic was sig-
nificant at a p-value of .001 with 999 permutations, implying presence of spatial auto-correlation
in the residuals. Hence, to account for the spatial correlation, I use different spatial models as de-
scribed in section 3.3, and incorporate the any association of the neighbors using K5 weight matrix.
Table 3.1 presents the statistics from the Lagrange multiplier test for the spatial error and lag
models (as represented by equations (3.4) and (3.5)). The Lagrange multiplier statistics for the
error and lag models are significant but the statistic from the Robust Lagrange multiplier test is
significant only for the error model. Thus, the optimal spatial model belongs to the category of
spatial error model as suggested by the Robust Lagrange multiplier test.
Additionally, I also test for the SLX model which implies dependency in the independent or
treatment variable as shown by equation (3.7). But, the residuals remain spatially correlated, and
therefore, I estimate the SDEM which incorporates correlation among errors along with the depen-
dency in the treatment variable as shown by equation (3.8). Table 3.2 provides the log likelihood
results, which compares the performance of the different spatial models. The Likelihood Ratio test
however does not imply a significant difference in the spatial error model and SDEM for either of
the outcomes, but they provide a better fit than the OLS model as indicated by a lower absolute
value of the ratio.
Table 3.3 presents the estimates from both the models suggested by the Lagrange Multiplier
test, the SDEM and the spatial error model, and also compares the results with the estimates ob-
tained from the OLS model. The table shows that the estimates imply a 0.076 percentage point
increase in the rural female literacy rate with a one percentage point increase in the intensity of
treatment. However, the coefficient estimate for WX (or the Weighted % of EBBs), which captures
the influence of the treatment received by the neighbors is insignificant. Thus, the results do not
suggest a significant association between the intensity of the treatment or the program received by
the neighboring districts and the literacy rate of district.
Table 3.4 provides the estimates from the various models for the second dependent variable,
decrease in rural gender gap in literacy rates (DGGRLR). The estimates imply a 0.02 percentage
point decrease in the gender gap in rural literacy rates with a one point increase in the intensity of
treatment. The coefficient estimate for WX (or the Weighted % of EBBs) is insignificant.
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Finally, to examine if the association vary between districts based on their intensity of treatment,
I divide my sample into two groups: low and high intensity. I divide the districts based on the me-
dian value of the intensity of treatment. Districts for which the treatment variable, that is, the
percentage of blocks that are educationally backward in a district is lower (higher) than the median
belong to the group low (high). This exercise will help to capture heterogeneity in the association.
Table 3.5 presents the SDEM estimates for the low and high districts separately. The table
shows that the influence of educational backwardness of a district is larger for districts in the high
group compared to districts in the low group, that is the districts which were more educationally
backward and hence received the program with higher intensity. However, the influence of the
educational backwardness of the neighboring districts, which is measured by the Weighted % of
EBBs term remains insignificant even for the districts in the high group, implying there is no asso-
ciation between the treatment received by the neighbors.
3.5 Conclusion
Several nations and states direct public resources to geographic areas that are lacking the ba-
sic amenities for development. There is a high possibility of spatial correlation and dependency
between neighboring areas in the independent or dependent variables. Not accounting for spatial
dependency may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates while studying the impact of the pro-
gram. Hence, it is important to investigate if there is presence of spatial correlation and if the
dependency is of a type that may bias the estimates.
In this paper, I use an education program in India which involved building schools and improv-
ing the schooling infrastructure and explore spatial dependency in the treatment and the outcome
variables of interest. The program targeted geographical districts that were educationally back-
ward. The educationally backward districts had a low level of rural female literacy rate and a high
level of the gender gap in literacy rate. I also estimate the association between the program and lit-
eracy using a spatial and a non-spatial model to compare if the spatial dependency in the variables
affect the measurement of the association.
I used the Moran’s I statistic to measure the global spatial correlation and the LISA cluster maps
to detect local spatial correlation. The data suggests evidences for presence of both global and lo-
cal spatial correlation. The LISA maps also suggest spatial clusters of both high and low regions,
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especially in the north-east and west of India, which are historically characterized by low levels
of development and literacy. To account for the spatial correlation, I use the Lagrange multiplier
and the likelihood ratio test to determine the appropriate spatial model and I use the spatially dis-
tributed error model (SDEM) as the model of choice. I also obtain estimates from the OLS model
without accounting for any spatial dependency.
The SDEM estimates are similar to the OLS estimates and there is no additional influence due to
the neighboring districts. In this case, the source of spatial dependency was the spatial correlation
in the errors, and the value of the estimate remains similar. It is recommended to be wary of spatial




Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Dis-
tricts in India in 2001
Variable Mean
% of EBBs 45.954
(1.683)
Rural Female Literacy Rate 47.417
(0.635)
Gender Gap in Literacy Rate 24.158
(0.324)
No. of Districts 581
% of EBBs: Percentage of Educationally
Backward Blocks in a district. The ta-
ble presents the summary statistics using the
Census 2001.
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Table 3.2: Lagrange Multiplier test for Spatial Model Selection
Statistic ∆ Rural Female Literacy Rate ∆ Gender Gap in Literacy





Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
∆ Rural Female Literacy Rate: Increase in rural female literacy rate, ∆ Gender
Gap in Literacy: Decrease in rural gender gap in literacy rates, LM: Lagrange
multiplier, RLM: Robust Lagrange multiplier. The table presents the statistics
from the Lagrange multiplier test for the spatial error and lag models. The La-
grange multiplier statistics for the error and lag models are significant but the
statistic from the Robust Lagrange multiplier test is significant only for the error
model. Thus, the suggested model belongs to the category of spatial error model.
Table 3.3: Likelihood ratio test to determine the optimal spatial
model
Outcome SDEM ERROR OLS
∆ Rural Female Literacy Rate -1552.3 -1553.8 -1660.9
∆ Gender Gap in Literacy -1181.9 -1184.4 -1308.9
SDEM: Spatial Durbin Error Model, ERROR: Spatial Error model,
OLS: Ordinary least squares, ∆ Rural Female Literacy Rate: Increase
in rural female literacy rate, ∆ Gender Gap in Literacy: Decrease in
rural gender gap in literacy rates. The likelihood ratio in the above
table is highest for the SDEM, closely followed by the Error model.
Thus, I choose SDEM as the optimal model.
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results for Increase in rural female
literacy rates
OLS SDEM Error
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate
% of EBBs 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.074***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Weighted % of EBBs -0.011
(0.01)
No. of Districts 576 576 576
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SDEM: Spatial Durbin Error Model, ERROR: Spatial Error
model, OLS: Ordinary least squares, % of EBBs: Percentage
of Educationally Backward Blocks in a district, Weighted % of
EBBs: Weighted matrix of Percentage of Educationally Back-
ward Blocks in the neighboring districts. The above table com-
pares the estimates from the different models. The SDEM es-
timates are slightly greater than the OLS estimates (0.076 com-
pared to 0.074). The SDEM estimate implies a 0.076 percentage
point increase in the rural female literacy rate for a one point in-
crease in the intensity of treatment or the educational backward-
ness of a district.
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results for Decrease in rural gender
gap in literacy rates
OLS SDEM Error
Variables Estimate Estimate Estimate
% of EBBs 0.02*** 0.0175*** 0.017***
(0.002) (.003) (0.003)
Weighted % of EBBs -0.003
(0.006)
No. of Districts 576 576 576
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SDEM: Spatial Durbin Error Model, Error: Spatial Error model,
OLS: Ordinary least squares, % of EBBs: Percentage of Edu-
cationally Backward Blocks in a district, Weighted % of EBBs:
Weighted matrix of Percentage of Educationally Backward Blocks
in the neighboring districts. The above table compares the esti-
mates from the different models. The SDEM estimates are similar
to the OLS estimates for decrease in rural gender gap in literacy
rates and it implies a 0.02 percentage point decrease in the rural
gender gap in literacy rates for a one point increase in the intensity
of treatment or the educational backwardness of a district.
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Table 3.6: Effect by different spatial regimes
∆ Rural Female Literacy Rate ∆ Gender Gap in Literacy
Variables Estimate Estimate
% of EBBs (High) 0.09*** 0.03***
(0.02) (0.009)
% of EBBs (Low) 0.06*** 0.01***
(0.01) (0.007)
Weighted % of EBBs (High) -0.01 -0.003
(0.01) (0.007)
Weighted % of EBBs (Low) -0.01 -0.004*
(0.02) (0.009)
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
∆ Rural Female Literacy Rate: Increase in rural female literacy rate, ∆ Gender Gap in Literacy:
Decrease in rural gender gap in literacy rates. The above table presents the SDEM estimates for
the two sub samples, low and high. The districts in the low (high) are districts with percentage
of educationally backward blocks lower (higher) than the median value. The % of EBBs and the
Weighted % of EBBs have the same meaning as in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, except that they are estimated
for the low and high groups separately. The table shows that the SDEM estimate is larger for the high
districts than the districts in the low group (.09 compared to .06). However, the association of the
neighboring districts, which is measured by the Weighted % of EBBs term remains insignificant even
for the high districts.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Frequency Distribution of Educationally Backward Blocks
The figure presents the histogram for the percentage of educationally backward blocks (EBBs) in districts of India.
There are many districts with no EBBs, whereas in some districts all the blocks are EBBs. The median percentage of
EBBs is 42.9.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Educationally Backward Blocks in Districts of India
The figure shows the quantile map for the percentage of educationally backward blocks (EBBs) in districts of India.
Districts with a darker shade have higher concentration of the EBBs and hence are more educationally backward than
districts with a lighter shade. There is also significant concentration of the educationally backward districts in certain
states of India, such as Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
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Figure 3.3: Quantile Map for the Outcome Variable: Increase in rural female literacy rate (IRFLR)
The figure shows the quantile map for the outcome variable increase in rural female literacy rates in the period of
2001-2011 in the districts of India. Districts with a darker shade have experienced a higher increase in the rural
female literacy rate in the last decade. On comparing figures 3.2 and 3.3, there is some overlap of districts with high
percentage of educationally backward blocks and districts that experienced a higher increase in the rural female
literacy rate.
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Figure 3.4: Global Moran’s I plot: Percentage of Educationally Backward Blocks
The figure presents the global Moran’s I plot for the treatment variable percentage of educationally backward blocks
(EBBs). The figure plots the relation between the treatment variable and it’s spatial lag (that is the value of the
variable for it’s neighbors), The plot is constructed using standardized values on the axes, such that each unit
corresponds to a standard deviation. The positively sloping fitted line through the scatter shows a positive spatial
autocorrelation between the districts in the intensity of treatment. The scatter plot is centered on the mean to divide
the plot into four quadrants. The top right and bottom left correspond to positive spatial autocorrelation whereas the
bottom right and top left correspond to negative spatial autocorrelation.
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Figure 3.5: Global Moran’s I plot: Increase in rural female literacy rate (IRFLR)
The figure presents the global Moran’s I plot for the outcome variable increase in rural female literacy rate in the
period of 2001-2011. The figure plots the relation between the treatment variable and its spatial lag (that is the value
of the variable for it’s neighbors). The plot is constructed using standardized values on the axes, such that each unit
corresponds to a standard deviation and the scatter plot is centered on the mean. The positively sloping fitted line
through the scatter shows a positive spatial autocorrelation between the districts in the outcome variable. The scatter
plot is centered on the mean to divide the plot into four quadrants. The top right and bottom left correspond to
positive spatial autocorrelation whereas the bottom right and top left correspond to negative spatial autocorrelation.
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Figure 3.6: LISA cluster map: Percentage of Educationally Backward Blocks
The figure presents the local indicator of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) cluster map for the treatment variable
percentage of educationally backward blocks (EBBs). High: Districts with high percentage of EBBs, Low: Districts
with low percentage of EBBs. The map shows the different spatial clusters or areas where there is higher degree of
spatial auto-correlation. For example a High-High region implies districts with high percentage of EBBs are
surrounded by districts with high percentage of EBBs (positive spatial correlation). Similarly, the Low-Low region
implies a cluster of districts with low concentration of EBBs (positive spatial correlation). A High-Low region
implies negative spatial correlation as High districts are surrounded by Low districts. Not significant implies no
significant local spatial autocorrelation. The significance level used to detect local spatial auto-correlation is less than
5%.
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Figure 3.7: LISA cluster map: Increase in rural female literacy rate (IRFLR)
The figure presents the local indicator of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) cluster map for the outcome variable increase
in rural female literacy rate (IRFLR). The map shows the different spatial clusters or hotspots, where there is higher
degree of local spatial auto-correlation. The district with high (low) IRFLR are labeled as high (low). A High-High
region implies districts with high IRFLR are surrounded by districts with high IRFLR (positive spatial correlation).
Similarly, the Low-Low region implies a cluster of districts with low concentration of IRFLR (positive spatial
correlation). A High-Low region implies negative spatial correlation as High districts are surrounded by Low
districts. Not significant implies no significant local spatial autocorrelation.The significance level used to detect local
spatial auto-correlation is less than 5%.
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Appendix A
APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: Change in boundaries of constituencies due to latest Redistricting
A sample of the boundaries of assembly constituencies before and after the latest redistricting which occurred after a gap of three decades. There
seems to be a significant change in the boundaries of the constituencies.
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Figure A.2: Skipping a Spatially Adjacent Constituency for SC Reservation
Constituency Addanki although eligible for reservation was skipped and Yerragondapalem was reserved instead. This was because Addanki was
adjacent to Santhanuthalapadu which had the highest percentage of Scheduled Castes population in Prakasam district in the state of Andhra
Pradesh. Source of the figure: http://www.cmsir.com/tdp/mla-profiles/. The figure has been modified slightly for presentation.
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There was no discontinuity at the cutoff for any of the covariates.
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The confidence intervals are large due to small number of constituencies reserved for Scheduled Tribes. There does not seem to be a difference
across reservation status of constituencies. Some positive effect on health facilities seems plausible.
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The figure does not suggest a difference between the levels of recreation, drinking water and communication facilities across unreserved and
reserved constituencies. However, not many villages seem to have credit facilities and the availability decreases for constituencies with higher
percentage of Scheduled Tribes population.
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SC reservation on Communication facilities
The outcome variables represent the growth in the level of village facilities from 2001 to 2011. The variables have been restricted to those that
could be found in both the Censuses. There has been a positive increase in all the facilities, but the SC constituencies seem to be falling behind in
case of transportation facilities.
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Table A.1: Controlling for number of years from elections to Census











Reserved for SC -0.029 -0.019 -0.033 -0.001 0.023 -0.015 -0.046 -0.013
(0.035) (0.039) (0.056) (0.016) (0.047) (0.056) (0.059) (0.016)
No. of Observations 530 549 532 550 501 534 537 550
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The table presents estimates for constituencies which had a gap of more than 2 years from the state elections to the Census. The results remain similar and insignificant. The number
of observations indicate the number of constituencies within the optimal CCT bandwidth.
A.1.1 Attributes of Candidates contesting in National Elections
In this section I explore whether there is difference in attributes of candidates for the national
elections due to reservation of parliamentary constituencies. A parliamentary constituency (PC) is
the relevant electoral unit for national elections. Delimitation defines boundaries of PCs and there
are 543 PCs. The national elections are first past the post system; candidate with the highest vote in
the PC is a Member of Parliament. The Delimitation Commission also reserves PCs for the Sched-
uled Castes and Scheduled Tribes using a similar algorithm as for the assembly constituencies. I
use a similar strategy of establishing a discontinuous relation between the proportion of reserved
population and reservation status.
Reservation of PCs for Scheduled Castes include similar exceptions as reservation of assembly
constituencies for Scheduled Castes, such as maintaining heterogeneity in the geographic distri-
bution of SC constituencies. As shown in the figure below, the probability of reservation for SC
increases by approximately 50 percentage points on crossing the threshold. Since, the number of
PCs are much smaller compared to assembly constituencies, there is a higher proportion of PCs
affected due to the exception for SC reservation.
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Table A.2: Reservation of PCs
(1)





Control % of SC Population
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The number of observations is equal to the number of
candidates within a bandwidth of 5.3 percentage points
around the cutoff of zero. The estimates remain similar
for different bandwidths. Percentage of Scheduled Castes
in the PC has been used as control.
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Rule for SC reservation
The percentage population of Scheduled Castes corresponding to the last PC reserved acts as the cutoff for this figure. The running variable is
normalised to have the cutoff as zero. All other points are differences of the percentage population from the cutoff.
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There are no exceptions to reservation of PCs for Scheduled Tribes. As shown in the figure
below, a PC is reserved with a probability of one on crossing the population cutoff for Scheduled
Tribes.
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Rule for ST reservation
The cutoff is normalized to zero and thus all other points are differences of the percentage population from the cutoff.
For PCs too, these imply a fuzzy and sharp regression discontinuity design. But, the sample
size is insufficient to find non parametric second stage RD estimates. Instead, I use two stage
least-squares method with a specification similar to that of fuzzy RD design and obtain parametric
estimates. I restrict the sample to a bandwidth of ten percentage points. I use affidavits of candi-
dates for national elections after the latest redistricting, that is in 2009 and 2014. The table below
presents the results for the effect of reservation of a PC on attributes of candidates. Candidates
from SC reserved constituencies have lower criminal records and total assets. The result are same
on controlling for incumbents. The estimates for total assets are negative but insignificant due to
high standard errors.
A.1.2 Overlapping old and new constituencies
I find the overlap area between the old and new constituencies by using geocoded maps of con-
stituencies. I overlay maps of the old constituencies on the new constituencies and find the overlap
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Table A.3: Effect on SC Reservation on Attributes of Candidates
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Has a criminal record Total Assets No.of Criminal Cases
Reserved for SC -0.119*** -7.299 -0.363**
(0.0389) (4.720) (0.152)
Constant 0.127*** 33.45*** 0.270
(0.0400) (5.198) (0.170)
Observations 5,611 5,548 5,610
R-squared 0.036 0.105 0.023
Control Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The number of observations imply the number of candidates within a bandwidth of ten percentage points, cutoff normalized
to zero. The nature of the estimates remain similar for different bandwidths. The regressions control for percentage of
Scheduled Castes and include state fixed effects.
percentage using the software ArcGIS. For every new constituency, I find the old constituency with
the largest area in the new constituency. The diagram below illustrates this:
The new constituency D comprises of 60 percent of the old constituency A, 30 percent of B, and
10 percent of C. The old constituency approximately similar to new constituency D is A. In case
of a 100 percent overlap this would imply that the old and new constituencies are the same. Else, I
find the constituency that is most similar to the new constituency.
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A.1.3 Effect of a Change in Reservation Status on Individual Villages
The strategy can be better understood using the following picture:
Let us assume the old constituencies A and B form the new constituency A. A was a reserved
constituency both before and after the redistricting, whereas B was not. The villages in B that
now belong to A, faced a change in constituency as well as a change in reservation status (of the
constituencies they belong to). To identify villages that experienced the change, I need to know the
villages that belonged to the old and new constituencies. I acquire the mapping between the vil-
lages and the old constituencies from the data used in Jensenius (2015). Raphael Susewind shared
the mapping of villages with the new constituencies and I update the data wherever required. I
combine both datasets and construct dummy variables for: whether a village experienced a change
in constituency, and whether the village experienced a change in reservation status.
Thus, based on whether a village experienced a change in boundary or reservation status, all the
villages can be classified as shown in the following table.
Reservation Status Change
Boundary Change Gained Reservation Lost Reservation No Changers
Yes
No
The reservation status of a village could change because it switched constituencies, or because
the reservation status of the constituency it belonged to changed.1 I estimate the change in the level
of public goods in a village because of the change in reservation status of the constituency using
1I use the initial sample of 2,801 constituencies and the 401,431 villages that comprised them. There were 14,410
villages for which the sample did not have the old reservation status and 2,166 observations for which it was unclear
if the villages changed constituencies. This leads to a final sample of 384,855 villages used in this analysis.
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the following specification:
∆Yi = α +β1SWi +β2BCi +β3SWi ∗BCi +∆Popr +λc + εi (A.1)
SWi =
{
1 if General to Reserved
0 if General to General
(A.2)
where ∆Yi is the change in the level of village facilities from 2001 to 2011, SWi=1 implies village
i is reserved after the redistricting and earlier was not, BCi indicates if the village changed con-
stituencies.2 The coefficient of interest is β3 for the interaction term SWi ∗BCi which captures the
effect of the change in reservation status from general to reserved for villages that changed con-
stituencies. ∆Popr is the growth in the reserved population comprising of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in the village from 2001 to 2011. The specification includes the old constituency
fixed effect denoted by λc and the errors are clustered at the constituency level.
Result from the above regression is presented in the table below and the estimates obtained are
insignificant and negative. The coefficients imply that on gaining a reservation status, percentage
of villages that have a middle school or higher decreases by 1.6 percentage points. Incorporating
the confidence interval, this implies any negative effect of greater than 2.8 percentage points can be
ruled out. This is not very different from the estimates obtained from the regression discontinuity
estimation for constituencies.3
2This implies that the control group in this case are villages which were unreserved before and after the redistrict-
ing. I also estimate a specification using all villages that did not change reservation status including those that were
reserved both before and after the redistricting as control group. The results do not change significantly.
3I also validate results by considering SC and ST reservation separately, the results do not change significantly.
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Table A.4: Effect on individual villages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Middle School or Higher Tap Phone/Post Office Hospitals/Health Centers Transport
Interact -0.0156 -0.0151 -0.0178 0.00375 -0.00685
(0.0123) (0.0225) (0.0221) (0.0145) (0.0137)
GEN to Reserved 0.00676 0.0198 0.000884 0.00271 0.00307
(0.0115) (0.0178) (0.0186) (0.0104) (0.0106)
Boundary Change 0.00410 -0.0156* 0.00290 0.000725 -0.00816*
(0.00393) (0.00804) (0.00824) (0.00478) (0.00470)
Constant 0.129*** 0.178*** 0.371*** 0.0130 0.0498
(0.0242) (0.0455) (0.0601) (0.0261) (0.0418)
Observations 348,862 347,207 347,200 342,502 346,297
R-squared 0.017 0.048 0.033 0.022 0.014
Control Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All the specifications include constituency level fixed effects and the growth in reserved population as control. The standard errors have been clustered at the constituency level. The
estimates of interest are presented in the first row of the table.
A.1.4 Effect of Reservation of Assembly constituencies on Facilities in a
District
An analysis of the effect of reservation of assembly constituencies on a district may help to
account for any spillovers between constituencies and internalize any friction due to change in
boundary of the constituencies. The assembly constituencies are never split between districts and
contained in one district. The below figure presents the map of districts in India and assembly
constituencies in a sample district:
Figure A.9: Districts and Assembly Constituencies in India
(a) Districts (b) ACs in a District
The question now relevant is slightly different, what is the effect of an increase in the number
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of reserved constituencies in a district. I use two methods to analyze this question. Figure 2 shows
that the number of constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes in a district will change depending
on if the predicted number of constituencies is greater than the 0.5 thresholds (that is 0.5, 1.5, 2.5
and so on). I stack all the thresholds and normalize them to be zero such that observations with
predicted number of seats between zero to 0.5 are on the left of the cutoff.
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Rule for SC reservation
This leads to a RD setup as shown in the above figure, where the number of SC seats or con-
stituencies is a discontinuous function of the predicted number of SC seats. The first stage estima-
tion for the relation is presented in the table below:
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Table A.5: First stage estimates
(1) (2)
VARIABLES #SC seats #SC seats
RD Estimate 0.426** 0.480***
(0.204) (0.178)
Observations 452 452
Band Width .17 .35
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The table shows that the probability of getting
one more SC seat increases by 0.43 for a district
on crossing the cutoff. The optimal bandwidth is
estimated using the CCT procedure and is 0.17
But, due to a small sample size, it is challenging to obtain precise estimates for a given band-
width. The RD plots for the second stage does not show any significant effect.
For the district level, I also explore another variation. Due to the latest redistricting, there was a
change in the number of assembly constituencies in a district and also a change in the number of
reserved assembly constituencies. So, some districts gained or lost the number of reserved assem-
bly constituencies. I construct a panel setup and estimate it using the following specifications:
Yit = α +α1SCGi +α3Posti +α4Posti ∗SCGi + εi (A.3)
where SCGi: increase in number of SC seats in district i and Posti=1 for 2011
Another alternative specification would be as follows:
Yit = α +α1SCGi +α2SCLi +α3Posti +α4Posti ∗SCGi +α5Posti ∗SCLi + εi (A.4)
where SCGi: increase in number of SC seats in district i, SCLi: decrease in number of SC seats in
district i, and Posti=1 for 2011
The results remain insignificant and do not differ significantly in either of the specifications.
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A.2 Data Appendix
A.2.1 Algorithm based on the Procedure of Reservation of Constituencies
The total number of assembly constituencies (ACs) in India has remained constant at 4,120.
The number of reserved constituencies depends on the relative share of the reserved group and
may change with the population growth. The total number of constituencies reserved for Sched-
uled Castes (SC) or Scheduled Tribes (ST) can be derived using the below formula:
Total No. of ACs reserved for SC (ST) = Total Population of SC (ST) in India* 4120Total Population of India
The number of constituencies allocated to a state depends on the population share of the state:4
No. of ACs in a State = Population of state * 4120Total Population of India
and the number of constituencies reserved in each state is based on the population share of the
reserved group, that is
No. of ACs reserved for SC/ST in a State= State Population of SC/ST*No. of ACs in the StateTotal Population of the State
For example, consider the state of Madhya Pradesh. The population numbers according to the
2001 census is as below:
2001 Population= 60 million
2001 SC Population= 9 million
2001 ST Population= 12 million
The total number of ACs allocated to the state is 230 out of 4120.
No. of ACs reserved for SC in a State = 9∗23060 =34.89=35.
Likewise, the number of ACs reserved for ST in a State is 41.
The Delimitation Commission divides the state into constituencies with similar population lev-
els.
4But, the 2001 population was not used to allocate constituencies across states. Thus, the number of constituencies
allocated to states remained the same in the latest delimitation.
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To maintain geographic heterogeneity for SC constituencies within a state, there is allocation of
SC constituencies (seats) across districts. The number of predicted SC constituencies for a district
can be derived using the following formula:
Pred No. of SC seats in a District (X) = District Population of SC*No. of SC seats in the StateTotal Population of SC in the State
From the formula above, the predicted number of constituencies, or X, can be a fraction. Since
the number of constituencies cannot be a fraction, the Commission uses the following criteria to
obtain the number of SC constituencies for a district:





To illustrate further, the state of Madhya Pradesh has 48 districts and 35 SC constituencies. Let
us consider the district of Sheopur in Madhya Pradesh: Sheopur has approximately one percent
of the SC population of the state, hence the predicted number of SC constituencies for Sheopur =
.01∗35 =.35. Since .35 < .5, the number of SC constituencies allocated to Sheopur is zero.
But, the district Morena has 3.6 percent of the SC population of the state, hence the predicted
number of SC constituencies for Morena = .036 ∗ 35 = 1.28. Since 1.28 < 1.5, the number of
SC constituencies allocated to Morena is one. For the district Sagar, the predicted number is 1.59
which is greater than 1.5. Therefore, the district Sagar is allocated two constituencies as reserved
for SC. Figure 2 represents the underlying step function used for allocation of SC constituencies
to districts.
After the allocation of SC constituencies to a district, the Commission reserves constituencies
with the highst SC population in the district. Hence, out of the six constituencies in the district
Morena, the constituency Ambah with the highest SC population is reserved. Whereas, for the
district Sagar, the constituencies Naryoli and Bina, with the highest and second higest SC popula-
tion are reserved. For ST reservation, there is no extra step of allocation across districts. Thus, the
Commission reserves the 41 ACs with the highest ST population in Madhya Pradesh for ST.
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A.2.2 Level of Public Goods for Constituencies
The census data on village facilities does not provide the constituency a village belongs to.
Thus, I required a mapping between the villages and constituencies to obtain the provision of pub-
lic goods for the constituencies. Since, I compare outcomes before and after the latest redistricting
too, I needed the mapping of villages to both the old and new constituencies. For this I use data
from two different sources.
Mapping Villages to Old constituencies
I use the data submitted on the American Economic Journal website Jensenius (2015). I would
like to acknowledge the source of this data. See Jensenius (2015) for details of the data. I use this
data to determine if a village belonged to a different constituency before and after the redistricting
or experienced a change in reservation status. I also use the data for some robustness checks.
Mapping Villages to New constituencies
To study the effect of quota on provision of public goods, I find the level of village facilities
in 2011 for the new constituencies. The mapping between the villages in 2011 and the new con-
stituencies was shared generously by Raphael Susewind. The data is protected under the Open
Data Commons Open Database license. This dataset was created using proprietary data of the
village location coordinates and shapefiles of the new constituencies. Some of the mapping was
incorrect because the shapefiles used were not accurate enough for a large scale analysis. The
villages in this data had the village codes of Census 2001.
To verify the consistency and accurateness of the data, I use information on the administrative ar-
eas of the constituencies. The Delimitation commission has reports of the redistricting process that
specifies the administrative areas of the constituencies. The administrative areas of the constituen-
cies specified are district, blocks, sub-blocks (Revenue Inspection circles and Patwari Circles).
Unfortunately, the villages that comprise a constituency is not provided. I use this information
on the extent of the constituencies as a starting point for verifying and updating the data provided
by Raphael Susewind. The information on the extent of the constituencies was also compiled by
S Anand and shared on Datameet. But, this data did not have the census codes for most of the
administrative divisions. Hence, I had to match by names of the administrative divisions.
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Methodology followed for checking the accuracy of the data
The lowest level of administrative unit in the delimitation report for the extent of the constituen-
cies was not consistent across all states. For example, some constituencies reported the extent
in terms of sub-blocks, but not others. To maintain consistency I considered extent of the con-
stituencies in terms of blocks, which was available for all states. I aggregate the data to have
constituency-block pairs. This would provide the correct composition of the constituencies. Sim-
ilarly, I aggregate the data on village-constituencies to have constituency-block pairs using the
mapping of villages and new constituencies. I match these two data sets to single out the pairs in
our data that do not exist in the original delimitation reports. This implies that if there were villages
mapped to an incorrect constituency, the particular constituency-block pair would not exist in the
papers of the Delimitation Commission. These helped weed out some villages that were mapped
incorrectly.
Another way to spot the erroneous cases was that the wrong constituency-block pairs would
have very few villages. I used this procedure to filter the correct cases from the incorrect or doubt-
ful ones. I could not match all constituency-block pairs across these two data sets due to matching
using strings. I updated the correct constituency names for the incorrect pairs manually from the
delimitation papers. I was able to do so for approximately 99 percent of the villages. I also used
another incomplete mapping between villages and constituencies shared by the state of Madhya
Pradesh to update the constituencies for some of the villages in it.
Public goods data at the village level for 2001 and 2011
Having established the mapping between villages of 2001 and the new constituencies, the next
step was to map this to the 2011 data. The village codes are different for 2001 and 2011. To link
the data I requested the directory of the census codes from the Census division of India. Few vil-
lages split or merged with other villages between 2001 and 2011. To tackle this issue I aggregate
the 2011 village facilities at the 2001 census level. This results in public good variables for 2001
and 2011 corresponding to villages that existed in 2001.
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A.3 Other Notes
1. At the state level, for majority of the states, the legislatures are composed of the Governor and
only one house called the legislative assembly or Vidhan Sabha. The states of Bihar, Jammu and
Kashmir, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh have an additional house called the legislative
council or Vidhan Parishad, similar to the Rajya Sabha at the national level. Andhra Pradesh and
the newly formed state Telangana have the legislative council since 2007 and 2014. Among the
union territories only Delhi and Pondicherry have legislative assemblies, thus other union territo-
ries are excluded from my analysis.
2. State legislators are also responsible for appointing members of the upper house of Parliament of
India called Rajya Sabha along with the President of India. The president can appoint 12 members
to be exact on the basis of exceptional contribution or expertise in variious fields, such as science
and art. (Source: rajyasabha.nic.in)
3. It is responsible for authorizing state expenditures, borrowing and taxes. The power to originate
money bills rests solely with the Legislative assemblies. Sales tax and VAT are the sources of
income for state governments. (Source: knowindia.gov.in)
4.To give an idea about how assembly constituencies overlap with the administrative divisions,
there are 35 states and union territories, 593 districts, 5,143 blocks in India according to Census
2001 and 4,120 assembly constituencies.
5.There is availability of several datasets for the administrative districts in India, but extrapolating
those variables for the assembly constituencies would be an inaccurate approximation.
6. The Representation of People’s Act, 1951 bars convicted citizens from contesting elections, but
there is no law against candidates with criminal charges. The Act of 1951 has some criticisms as
there might be bias in prosecuting the elites or the powerful with charges against them to prevent
or delay conviction making them eligible to stand for elections. An amendment to this Act has
been proposed, but not implemented yet (Dutta, 2015).
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Appendix B
APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Additional Figures
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The figure plots the average number of schools built in an EBB/NEBB in the last decade. The growth of different kinds of schools is also depicted
above. We see that in the past decade on average more schools were built in an EBB compared to a NEBB. KGBV schools have been built only in
the EBBs and the number of girls’ schools have been on the rise too.
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The figure plots the average number of schools built in an EBB/NEBB in the decade of 1990-2000. The growth of different kinds of schools is also
depicted above. We see the number of schools built in an EBB vs a NEBB is not very different in this decade. According to the data there were
fifteen KGBV schools in total that were built in this decade.
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Gender gap in Literacy'01
The figure plots the reduced form outcomes when the running variable is taken as the gender gap in total literacy rates for Census 2001. The
sample considered satisfies the other criteria of having rural female literacy rates below the cutoff of 46.13%. We see that there is no significant
discontinuity at the cutoff in either of the outcomes.
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The figure shows that there was no discontinuity at the cutoff ruling out chances of manipulation.
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Female Rural Literacy Rate
The figure shows that there was no discontinuity at the cutoff for any of the covariates.
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Female Rural Literacy Rate '01
The figure plots the total number of schools built in an EBB/NEBB in the decade of 1990-2000. We see that lesser number of schools were
established in the EBBs compared to NEBBs and there is no discontinuity at the cutoff.
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excludes outside values
The figure shows that change in the outcome variables, increase in female literacy rate and decrease in gender gap in literacy rate in the rural areas
was larger for the higher quartiles.
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excludes outside values
Gender Gap
Outcomes as Per Intensity of Treatment
Before After
The figure shows that the decrease in gender gap in literacy rate was significantly higher for the districts with higher concentration of EBBs
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B.1.1 Analysis of Funds
The SSA funds are disbursed in the form of three grants; school development grant (SDG),
school maintenance grant (SMG) and teaching learning material grant (TLM). Data on funds under
NPEGEL and KGBV scheme is currently unavailable at the block level. For comparison purposes
I have calculated the funds received by all the schools in a block per thousand children in thousand
dollars. For the population of children I use the data from Census 2001 which reports population
of children aged between 0 to 6 in rural region of the respective block. Population of children
in the age group 0 to 6 may not be the best measure, but I use this as a proxy for population of
children that would go to school. I also convert the value of funds measured in Indian rupees by
the exchange rate for the respective academic year in which the fund was received by the school as
reported and captured in the DISE data.
To have some evidence regarding the utilization of funds by schools, I use the DISE data to plot
Figure B.10. The DISE data reports each of these funds received and spent by schools over the
academic years 2005-2011. I aggregate this information at the block level to obtain the balance
of underutilized fund by all the schools in a block. From Figure B.10 we can see the difference is
positive, i.e the expenditure has always been lower than the amount received suggesting unspent
balance. We can see there is more unspent balance in the NEBB and the unspent balance of the
SMG has grown dramatically over the years. It is also evident that a school in EBB has received
less school development grant (SDG) on average but the number has grown over the years.
The issue in doing a comprehensive analysis of fund utilization is that there is unavailability of
other data on funds at the block level. The data from DISE was the only source of some information
at the school level, but we do not know the components of the expenditure for diffrent facilities.
Thus, using the allocations and expenditure report at state level, I find the major component of
expenditure were civil works and teacher salaries. Another drawback is that SDG is received and
reported only by an existing school and not by schools that are in the process of construction.
I currently do not have any data to illustrate the nature and amount of funds received by a new
school. Finally, the allocation of funds from the Center was at least based on some approximate
methodology, however the exact rule is unclear. But, the allocation of funds to lower administrative
levels seems to be based on the need of the area and schools. The exact methodology remains to
be investigated.
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Rec-received, Exp-Expenditure. The figure plots the difference in received and expenditure amounts of the school development grant (SDG),
school maintenance grant (SMG), teaching learning material grant (TLM) over the academic years 2005-2011. The variables are measured in 1000
dollars and per thousand children in the rural region of the block. The years are labelled from 1 to 7. The graphs provide a comparison between the
EBB vis-a-vis NEBB. It shows that the expenditure of funds was lower than the funds received and there is more unspent balance in the NEBB.
The unspent balance of the SMG has grown dramatically over the years.
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B.2 Data Appendix
India currently has 29 states, 7 union territories, 640 districts (Census 2011), but the boundaries
of geographical regions have not remained the same over the decades, let alone their names. How-
ever, the boundaries of blocks, which are smaller than districts, did not change considerably in the
last decade. The major hurdle in linking datasets is that there is no common ID across the data sets,
hence the datasets have to be matched using names of the regions. Even the Census data for 2001
and 2011 do not have the same location code for blocks. To overcome this and match the datasets
correctly, I matched data sets using the names of state-district-block. The challenge in mtaching
datasets using names is that there has been change in names of the administrative divisions across
years, or they have different spellings across datasets. The reason for being spelled differently
mostly is because the names of administrative divisions are in the regional language, hence often
there is more than one way to spell it in English.
First, I matched the Census dataset for 2001 and 2011. I use the primary census abstract tables
of the census data for years 2001 and 2011 which has information on population of a region and
number of literates at different administrative levels. The tables report values for the demographic
variables separately for the rural, urban or total areas in a block. Based on this, the rural and total
variables are created separately. For example, the rural female literacy rate of 2001 is calculated by
taking the number of literate population in the rural area of the block above age 6 as a percentage
of the total rural population in the block in 2001. The total literacy rate is calculated similarly but
by taking the total literate population above age 6 as a percentage of the total population in the
block. The number of blocks in 2001 was 5,463. In situations when I was unable to match due
to change in names or spellings, I followed the strategy of renaming all the divisions according
to their names in 2001 and created a unique dataset of the Census demographic variables for the
years 2001 and 2011 for blocks. This however reduced my sample to 5,299 blocks for the data
considering total area of the block and 5,225 blocks on the data considering rural area of the block.
Second, I match the census data with the list of classification of blocks as EBB/NEBB. I use the
data for the classification from the SSA program website. The major difficulty in matching and
drop in sample size happened at this stage. This was because the list of classification of blocks
was prepared by the Department of Education and Literacy, and the names in this dataset were
very different from those in the census. Thus, I once again followed the strategy of matching these
names with the names of the census dataset by renaming the areas consistently with the Census
2001 names whenever possible. This led to the final sample size of 4,218 unique areas which is a
combination of state, district and block.
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The final step was to match the school census from DISE which is the unique source of infor-
mation on schools in India capturing their enrollment, facilities and location. Linking the DISE
data once again required to do matching based on names of the areas, as the DISE data has no
corresponding code to link with the census data. This reduced my sample size further to 3,991
which is the final dataset I use throughout the paper. The drop in observations during matching
should not affect the results as the drop was uniform over the classification as EBB, and hence the
proportion of EBBs and NEBBs in the reduced sample was similar to the proportion in the original
sample.
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